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REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AS HEALTH CARE 
RIGHTS 
B. JESSIE HILL*
The idea that abortion rights are central to protecting women’s 
health will hardly come as a surprise to most reproductive rights advocates. 
For example, much of the recent litigation challenging states’ legal 
restrictions on abortion has centered around the requirement of a health 
exception—that is, around the question of whether legislation regulating 
abortion must contain an exception for cases where the regulated procedure 
is necessary to protect the woman’s health.
 
1 Reproductive rights 
organizations also often espouse the language of “women’s health.”2
                                                 
* Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Center for Social Justice, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank the Columbia Journal of 
Gender and Law and the Center for Reproductive Rights for inviting me to participate in this 
symposium. I would also like to thank Jessica Berg, Sharona Hoffman, and Max Mehlman 
for their helpful comments and suggestions. Justine Konicki and Jack Blanton provided 
excellent research assistance. All errors are mine. 
 
1 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502, 511–12, 
517 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding the district court’s preliminary injunction against a state law 
regulating the abortion drug mifepristone, also known as RU-486, on the ground that the lack 
of a health exception may pose significant risks to some women’s health but remanding to 
the district court for reconsideration of the scope of the injunction); Planned Parenthood of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down Idaho’s parental 
consent law due to the insufficiency of its health exception); Planned Parenthood of Rocky 
Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910, 927 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
Colorado’s parental notice law “is unconstitutional because it fails to provide a health 
exception as required by the Constitution of the United States”). Litigation over the health 
exception is probably less likely in the future, due to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007), that the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban 
Act was facially constitutional despite its lack of a health exception. 
2 The Center for Reproductive Rights draws an explicit connection between the 
human right to health and reproductive rights. See, e.g., Letter from Melissa Upreti, Legal 
Advisor for Asia, Center for Reproductive Rights, to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee), at 1, 3 (Jan. 15, 2007), 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_sl_CEDAW_Indi
a2007.pdf. The American Civil Liberties Union’s Reproductive Freedom Project decries the 
threat to women’s health posed by the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, Press Release, 
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU and National Abortion Federation Criticize Decision 
by U.S. Supreme Court Upholding Federal Abortion Ban (Apr. 18, 2007), 
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/abortion/29423prs20070418.html, and by rules 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1490073
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Indeed, those organizations, along with numerous other NGOs and some 
scholars, advocate greater recognition of the fact that reproductive health 
care in all its manifestations—not just access to abortion and contraception, 
but also access to safe obstetric and gynecologic care, adequate prenatal 
nutrition and care, and sexually transmitted disease prevention—is an 
important part of women’s health care in general.3
If abortion is placed in the framework of health care, the right to 
access abortion may then be considered to be an aspect of the right to 
health. This right to health, moreover, should be conceived as a negative 
right, not as a positive right. Although the distinction between positive and 
negative rights is not always airtight,
 At the same time, 
however, feminist legal scholars have largely shied away from discussing 
abortion as primarily a medical procedure, instead emphasizing the idea of 
abortion as an intensely personal decision and as a right that is essential to 
women’s equal citizenship. This framework underscores the concepts of 
decisional autonomy and equality underpinning the constitutional right to 
choose abortion. Although there are valid reasons for the emphasis taken by 
those reproductive rights scholars, this Article argues that it may be time to 
consider embracing an approach that emphasizes abortion as a form of 
health care. 
4 it may be roughly described as 
follows. A positive right is generally considered to be an entitlement to 
something—a right to call on the government to provide, at government 
expense, a particular public good, such as shelter, education, or medical 
care.5 Such rights are sometimes referred to as “socio–economic rights,” 
and they are recognized as constitutional rights in a number of foreign 
countries.6
                                                                                                                 
allowing individuals and entities to opt out of providing reproductive health care services, 
Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls Again for Withdrawal of 
Regulations Jeopardizing Women’s Health (Sept. 28, 2008), 
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/gen/36945prs20080926.html. 
 International law and numerous national constitutions, 
3 See, e.g., Serra Sippel, Achieving Global Sexual and Reproductive Health and 
Rights, 35 HUM. RTS. 13, 13 (2008); Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of 
Human Rights Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 480–81 (2008). 
4 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and 
Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005) (questioning the distinction 
between negative and positive rights as it is conventionally understood). 
5 Id. at 5; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1895 (2004). 
6 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 3–4 (citing examples of constitutions that recognize 
positive rights); Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1895 n.2. 
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moreover, specifically recognize a right to health, which is in most 
instances understood as a positive entitlement to health care.7 Negative 
rights, by contrast, are simply rights to be free of governmental interference 
with one’s decision to do something; they are “negative checks on 
government, preserving a sphere of private immunity.”8 The United States 
Constitution is usually understood to confer only negative rights; this 
understanding is largely based on a perception that negative rights fit best 
within the paradigm of classical liberalism, that they are more easily 
enforceable by courts than positive rights, and that their recognition does 
not generally have major budgetary implications. Consequently, the judicial 
enforcement of negative rights does not raise the separation of powers 
concerns that might be raised by court–ordered rearrangement of legislative 
priorities and substantial monetary outlays to provide certain goods to the 
public.9
As this Article demonstrates, the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence suggests the existence of a negative right to health, but this 
notion has not yet been fully explored by courts or by advocates. Thus, 
although the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly embraced the notion of a 
right to medical decision–making autonomy or a right to health, it is a 
concept whose time has come. Indeed, other countries have started to 
recognize and operationalize a negative right to health in ways that 
encompass the right to reproductive health care. These countries’ 
jurisprudence may serve as model for thinking about how such a right could 
be understood and incorporated into U.S. law. 
 A negative right to health could thus be understood as a right 
against government interference in health care access and medical 
decision–making, rather than a right to government–provided medical 
services. 
                                                 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. & 
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 51, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. 
Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); see generally Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian Alexander Clark, 
Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 37 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 285 (2004) (compiling provisions relating to the right to health care, if 
any, in the constitution of every country in the world). 
8 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 4 (internal citation omitted). 
9 Id. at 4–5; Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1895–97; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 
62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392–94 (1984). Cass Sunstein, for one, questions whether those 
rationales, or many of the others commonly given, adequately explain the absence of positive 
rights in the United States. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 8–19. 
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Thus, this Article draws on models from other countries in order to 
consider, in broad strokes, what a negative right to health might be 
understood to mean. Specifically, this Article discusses two cases in which 
the high courts of other countries have recognized and applied a 
constitutional right to health in ways that seem particularly applicable and 
translatable to American constitutional law. Both the Canadian Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Court of South Africa have recently rendered 
decisions exploring and applying the constitutional right to health to cases 
outside the abortion context.10 This right to health, which is conceived by 
those courts, at least in part, as a negative right to noninterference with 
medical treatment decisions and the doctor–patient relationship, can and 
should be recognized in the United States as well, along with the rights to 
privacy, autonomy, and bodily integrity protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive due process guarantees.11
Embracing this discourse will have distinct legal and political 
advantages for reproductive rights advocates. First, it may provide a 
framework for challenging certain kinds of restrictions on abortion rights 
that can be extraordinarily burdensome yet are usually found to be 
constitutional under current reproductive rights jurisprudence. Further, it 
may help to create broader political appeal for the protection of 
reproductive rights by placing those rights in a gender–neutral context to 
which a large portion of the population can relate. Of course, a discourse 
foregrounding the right to choose abortion as an aspect of a negative right 
to health also has certain limitations. It will not improve access to abortion 
for women who cannot afford it, for example, and it may not be sufficient to 
protect the core of the right to abortion itself. This Article does not, 
therefore, advocate viewing abortion rights only as growing out of a 
negative right to access medical care without government interference. 
Rather, this Article argues that this is one way to frame abortion rights, 
which may be particularly useful for certain purposes, and that this 
 In addition, the right to 
choose abortion can and should be understood to be protected in part (but 
not exclusively) by that right. The Canadian and South African decisions 
may therefore provide a model for shaping both legal and political 
discourse concerning reproductive rights around the notion of a negative 
right to health. 
                                                 
10 Chaoulli v. Québec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.); Minister of Health v. Treatment 
Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
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framework should be deployed alongside existing arguments about privacy, 
autonomy, equality, and dignity. 
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the conceptualization of 
reproductive rights as an aspect of a negative right to health was an early 
feature of Supreme Court jurisprudence, but that both the Court’s more 
recent jurisprudence and legal scholars’ analyses have moved away from 
this understanding. Instead, the Court’s jurisprudence has been grounded in 
concepts of privacy, equality, and autonomy in making important life 
decisions. Part I also proposes some reasons why feminist scholars have 
tended to downplay the view of abortion rights as encompassed within the 
negative right to health and suggests that those reasons should not continue 
to hold sway. 
Part II then briefly describes the recent decisions of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Chaoulli v. Québec12 and of the South African 
Constitutional Court in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign13
Finally, Part III discusses why this is a particularly promising way 
of framing reproductive rights for the future. Specifically, Part III argues 
that the negative right to health, which already exists in incipient form in 
U.S. constitutional law, would be particularly useful for attacking certain 
kinds of legislation limiting reproductive rights, such as misleading 
informed consent laws, mandatory ultrasound requirements, prohibitions on 
particular methods of abortion, and onerous administrative regulations 
pertaining exclusively to abortion providers.
 
and draws on those opinions to consider how one might more fully conceive 
of a negative right to health—and of the abortion right as one aspect of that 
negative health care right—within U.S. constitutional law. The right to 
health in both cases is conceived as a right against government–mandated 
harm, whether in the form of denial of or delay in access to medical 
treatment. That harm, moreover, is broadly conceived to include physical, 
emotional, and psychological harm. While not limitless, the negative right 
to health is also a robust right against interference with the doctor–patient 
relationship and the decision–making that arises from that relationship. 
14
                                                 
12 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.). 
 Moreover, it may provide a 
means of garnering wider political support for abortion rights. 
13 2002, (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
14 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to an informed consent statute requiring 
women be told that in obtaining an abortion they are “terminat[ing] the life of a whole, 
separate, unique, living human being”); Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 
F.3d 502, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming preliminary injunction against a state law 
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I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN 
ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE 
The right to choose abortion is a multifaceted one, comprising 
many different rights. Most famously, of course, the right to an abortion is 
described as a right to privacy, which usually means a right to make certain 
intensely personal, fundamental, and potentially life–changing decisions 
without interference from the government.15 It is also in part a right to 
equality—a right that is essential in order for women to be able to pursue 
their chosen life paths on the same terms as men, without fear of being 
forced into unplanned and unwanted childbearing.16 Finally, the right to 
choose abortion is a right to bodily integrity: a right against being forced to 
put one’s womb in the service of the state’s claimed interest in potential 
life.17
The right to abortion is also a health care right. It is a right to access 
a particular medical procedure and a right to use that medical procedure to 
protect one’s health from significant harm, even if that procedure terminates 
a potential life. In fact, as explained in this Part, reproductive rights, 
including the right to contraception, have long been conceived in this way. 
The understanding of reproductive rights as health care rights, which has 
long been present in reproductive rights jurisprudence, has been 
downplayed by both courts and reproductive rights advocates in favor of a 
 
                                                                                                                 
regulating mifepristone (RU-486) but opining that the injunction may need modification); 
Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 537, 557 (9th Cir. 2004) (mostly rejecting a 
constitutional challenge to onerous statutory and administrative scheme governing abortion 
providers); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, 317 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to onerous administrative regulations governing abortion 
providers). 
15 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education . . . . 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define 
the attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the State.”). 
16 Id. at 856 (“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and 
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive 
lives.”). 
17 Id. at 857 (describing the abortion right as being, in part, a right of “bodily 
integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to 
mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection”). 
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rhetoric centered on personal autonomy, equality, and dignity.18
A. The Right to Health and the Medical Model of Abortion in Ear ly 
Abortion Jur isprudence 
 This Part 
explores the reasons why this strand of reproductive rights jurisprudence 
has largely been lost or ignored and suggests that those reasons should not 
continue to hold sway. 
One strain that unquestionably runs through American abortion 
jurisprudence is the notion that abortion is a health care decision, to be 
made by the woman and her physician without government interference, 
and therefore that the abortion right is in part a negative health care right. 
This view of abortion may be labeled the “medical model” of abortion, 
according to which abortion is seen simply as one among many surgical 
procedures, whose appropriateness is to be determined in the same way that 
the appropriateness of other medical interventions is determined—using 
professional clinical judgment.19 In the medical model of abortion, the 
physician plays a central role, exercising at least as much power as the 
woman to decide whether the abortion should be performed. Indeed, 
according to the medical model, abortion restrictions may violate the 
physician’s right to practice medicine as much as the woman’s right to 
privacy and autonomy.20
The predominance of the medical model of abortion is apparent in 
Roe v. Wade, with its heavy reliance on medico–legal history.
 The medical model of abortion is thus the basis for 
understanding reproductive rights as negative health care rights. 
21
                                                 
18 See infra Parts I.A and I.B. 
 The Court 
in Roe, summing up its holding, emphatically stated that its decision 
“vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment 
19 Of course, at least since the approval of the abortifacient mifepristone by the 
FDA in 2000, abortion may be performed medically as well as surgically; even before the 
approval of mifepristone, the cancer drug methotrexate was used by medical professionals to 
induce abortions. See generally Malcolm Potts, Non-Surgical Abortion: Who’s for 
Methotrexate?, 346 LANCET 655 (1995). 
20 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973) (discussing “the right of the 
physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment”); Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193 (1973) (discussing “the physician’s right to practice his 
profession”); Elizabeth Reilly, “The Jurisprudence of Doubt”: How the Premises of the 
Supreme Court’s Abortion Jurisprudence Undermine Procreative Liberty, 14 J.L. & POL. 
757, 774-77 (1998). 
21 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 130–47. 
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according to his professional judgment up to the points where important 
state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.”22 Until the 
point of viability, when the state’s interest in the fetus becomes compelling, 
the Court explained, “the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, 
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest 
with the physician.”23 The Court was not alone in viewing the issue in Roe 
as, at least in part, an issue of medical decision–making autonomy. The 
lawyers for Jane Roe began the substantive portion of their Supreme Court 
brief with the heading, “The Right to Seek and Receive Medical Care for 
the Protection of Health and Well–Being Is a Fundamental Personal Liberty 
Recognized by Decisions of This Court.”24 Thus, the plaintiffs asserted—in 
what they must have viewed to be their strongest argument, given its 
prominence in the brief—that “the personal right to care for one’s health is 
a fundamental right.”25 Simply put, the abortion restrictions at issue in Roe 
were seen as “den[ying] Appellants . . . access to health care.”26 Elsewhere, 
the plaintiffs described this right even more broadly, as the “right to care for 
and protect one’s health in the manner one deems best.”27
Similarly, the Court in Doe v. Bolton,
 
28 the companion case to Roe 
v. Wade, repeatedly compared the abortion procedure to other surgical 
procedures, noting that the Georgia statute at issue in that case regulated 
abortion in ways that were unimaginable for other surgeries, and underlined 
the importance of the physician’s medical judgment in determining the 
appropriateness of abortion in an individual case.29
                                                 
22 Id. at 165–66. 
 That medical judgment 
23 Id. at 166 (emphasis added). 
24 See Brief for Appellants at 94–98, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971) (No. 70–
18), 1971 WL 128054; see also Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of 
Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 171–72 (2006). 
25 Brief for Appellants, supra note 24, at 95. 
26 Id. at 98. The plaintiffs also noted that several medical organizations “draw no 
distinction between abortion and other medical procedures.” Id. 
27 Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
28 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
29 See, e.g., Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197 (“We are not cited to any other surgical 
procedure made subject to committee approval as a matter of state criminal law.”); id. at 199 
(“Again, no other voluntary medical or surgical procedure for which Georgia requires 
confirmation by two other physicians has been cited to us. If a physician is licensed by the 
State, he is recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment.”); 
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was broadly conceived, moreover, including the physician’s ability to take 
into account emotional, psychological, and even “familial” factors. Such an 
inclusive understanding, the Court explained, “allows the physician the 
room he needs to make his best medical judgment”; this exercise of 
judgment “operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant 
woman.”30 Therefore, as in Roe, the Court suggested that not only the 
woman’s privacy rights but also “the physician’s right to practice his 
profession” could be violated by certain kinds of abortion restrictions.31 But 
of course, the flip side of the physician’s right to administer treatment was 
“[t]he woman’s right to receive medical care in accordance with her 
licensed physician’s best judgment.”32
Even before Roe and Doe, however, the right to contraception was 
viewed in part as a right to access medical treatment and protect one’s 
health. Early state court cases involving challenges to contraceptive 
prohibitions centered in large part on the lack of a health exception and the 
right of women to protect themselves from pregnancies that could pose 
 
                                                                                                                 
cf. id. at 192 (noting that “where a particular operation is necessary for a patient’s physical or 
mental health is a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely 
whenever surgery is considered”). 
30 Id. at 192. 
31 Id. at 193 (striking down the portion of a Georgia abortion statute requiring that 
a hospital committee approve each individual abortion). The Court’s apotheosis of 
physicians and their professional judgment in Doe is truly striking in some places. For 
example, although it held the committee-approval requirement for abortions unconstitutional, 
the Court nonetheless dismissed the possibility that the hospital committee would be guided 
in its decisions by anything other than pure medical judgment, such as their personal 
disapproval of extramarital sex: 
The appellants’ suggestion is somewhat degrading to the conscientious 
physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity is 
concerned with the physical and mental welfare, the woes, the emotions, 
and the concern of his female patients. He, perhaps more than anyone 
else, is knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and he is aware of 
human frailty, so-called ‘error,’ and needs. The good physician—despite 
the presence of rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust 
that most physicians are ‘good’—will have sympathy and understanding 
for the pregnant patient that probably are not exceeded by those who 
participate in other areas of professional counseling. 
Id. at 196–97. 
32 Id. at 197. 
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severe threats.33 Even in Griswold v. Connecticut, traces of the medical 
view of reproductive rights are visible, for example, in the Court’s objection 
to the way that the Connecticut contraceptives ban “operate[d] directly on 
an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one 
aspect of that relation.”34 Thus, while cases such as Griswold, Roe, and Doe 
were obviously the foundations for later reproductive rights jurisprudence 
that places the abortion right in the context of privacy, personal decision–
making autonomy, and general bodily integrity, they contained another 
undeniable strand: a conception of reproductive rights as negative health 
care rights.35
B. The Shift Away from the Medical Model of Abor tion 
 
Although the conception of reproductive rights as negative health 
care rights coexisted with many other rights–conceptions at the onset of the 
abortion rights debate, this strand has largely been lost or ignored by later 
courts and legal scholars. In part, the tendency to ignore the healthcare 
aspect of abortion rights might be attributable to the harsh criticism to 
which the medical view of abortion has been subjected. For example, many 
feminist scholars have criticized the medical model of abortion presented by 
decisions such as Roe and Doe for its tendency to place the abortion 
decision primarily in the physician’s hands rather than the patient’s, as well 
as for its emphasis on the centrality of professional medical judgment as 
opposed to the woman’s individual personal and moral judgment. They 
argue that Roe was at best incomplete and at worst reinforcing of gender 
inequalities when it emphasized the medical aspects of abortion rather than 
its importance in securing equal citizenship for women.36
                                                 
33 Connecticut was the site of one such battle. For a complete history, see Mary L. 
Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 921–27, 932–35 (1990). 
 And in vesting 
34 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (emphasis added). 
35 See Part III.A, infra, for additional discussion. 
36 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 273–79 
(1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1992) (“The idea of the woman in control of her 
destiny and her place in society was less prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled 
with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her physician’s medical judgment. 
The Roe decision might have been less of a storm center had it homed in more precisely on 
the women’s equality dimension of the issue.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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primary control over the abortion decision in the physician, rather than the 
woman, such critics contend, the medical model of abortion simply 
transfers authority over women’s bodies and choices from the state to the 
physician while keeping the woman disempowered. Thus, some abortion 
rights advocates in the 1960’s argued that even liberally reforming abortion 
laws—for example, to permit abortions only for health reasons, but with 
“health reasons” being generously defined—rather than repealing the 
criminal abortion laws altogether, “would simply mean that (primarily 
male) physicians would have wider latitude to make a decision that these 
women believed was the business only of the pregnant woman. The 
necessity of a doctor’s approval, even under reformed abortion laws, 
reinforced the traditional role of the woman as dependent, without control 
over her future.”37
Perhaps most influentially, Professor Reva Siegel has described the 
role of physicians in the early anti–abortion movement in America, and her 
scholarship gives ample reason to distrust medical and physiological 
rhetoric as it is used to justify restrictions on abortion. In her classic article 
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation 
and Questions of Equal Protection, Professor Siegel explains that 
physicians who opposed abortion appropriated the language of women’s 
health for their own ends, suggesting that interruption of pregnancy and, 
more fundamentally, of women’s maternal destiny, was injurious to them 
both physiologically and psychologically.
 
38 Moreover, those physicians 
used physiological arguments to achieve the social end of maintaining 
existing societal arrangements with respect to gender.39
                                                 
37 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 45 (1990); see also 
KRISTIN LUKER,  ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 33 (1984) (noting that in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “physicians wanted to create a category of 
‘justifiable’ abortion and to make themselves the custodians of it”); Siegel, Reasoning, supra 
note 36, at 296 (describing how physicians’ rhetoric in the nineteenth century suggested that 
“[t]he physician was to serve as his [female] patient’s ‘confessor’ and ‘physical guardian’”). 
 Thus, “[m]en 
interested in establishing their professional authority over women’s role in 
reproduction encouraged other men [i.e., legislators] to assert their political 
authority over women’s role in reproduction by criminalizing the means of 
38 Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 293–97. 
39 Id. at 299–314; cf. JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND 
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY 147–70 (1977) (documenting the physicians’ movement 
against abortion in the nineteenth century and concluding that it was motivated in large part 
by a desire to professionalize medicine, raise its status, and eliminate competition from 
outsiders providing obstetric services, as well as by eugenic concerns and genuine moral 
opposition to the practice). 
12 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 18:2 
controlling birth, each acting to preserve life in the social order as they 
knew it.”40
Professor Siegel also documents the role that such physiological 
arguments continue to play in both popular rhetoric and case law 
concerning pregnancy, abortion, and fetal protection.
 
41 More recently, she 
has connected gender–based physiological arguments to the rise of 
“woman–protective” abortion legislation, such as the proposed 2006 South 
Dakota abortion ban, which was justified in terms of protecting women 
from the physical and mental health risks of abortion, while relying upon 
and perpetuating stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s proper 
role in society.42
Moreover, some recent scholarship suggests that physicians 
continue to exercise inappropriate and excessive control in the reproductive 
health context—for example, by valuing the fetus over the woman, whose 
life and labor are virtually erased from contemporary debates about fetal 
protection.
 
43 Professor Nancy Ehrenreich has persuasively demonstrated 
that the “medical model of reproduction,” which creates the illusion of pure 
objectivity in medicine, constructs a dichotomy whereby “medicine is seen 
as a scientific endeavor in which nature is controlled through culture—
through active intervention by physicians. On the other hand, reproduction 
(and the women in whose bodies it occurs) is seen as a pathological, 
disease–like condition—the object that must be acted upon and controlled 
in order to eliminate danger.”44
                                                 
40 Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 318. 
 Women are not, therefore, vital agents in 
control of the process of reproduction but rather objects to be managed or 
controlled. That view of reproduction, combined with a high moral and 
41 Id. at 324-47. 
42 Reva Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics] 
(discussing H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006) (repealed 2006)); cf. Reva Siegel, 
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 
YALE L.J. 1694, 1720–33 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dignity] (discussing the recent strategy 
of some abortion opponents of focusing on women’s health). In November 2008, a second 
South Dakota initiative on abortion failed at the ballot box. See Tiffany Sharples, Ballot 
Initiatives: No to Gay Marriage, Anti-Abortion Measures, TIME, Nov. 5, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1856820,00.html. 
43 Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 505 
(1993); Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 330 n.285. 
44 Ehrenreich, supra note 43, at 538. 
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social value placed on the fetus and societal expectations that women will 
be self–sacrificing, is used to justify coercive measures, such as court–
ordered cesarean sections, when women resist their passive role.45 
Similarly, Professor Michelle Oberman has argued that in so–called 
“maternal–fetal conflicts,” the doctor is presented as the wise and neutral 
mediator, whereas in reality “[i]t is the doctor who identifies the course of 
action deemed to be ‘in the fetus’s best interests,’” perhaps even viewing 
the fetus as a “second patient,” thereby becoming a party to the conflict and 
invariably “tip[ping] the balance . . . against the pregnant woman.”46
Often, this understanding of medicine and its relation to 
reproduction visits disproportionate burdens on poor and minority women, 
against whom the state’s coercive power is most likely to be exercised in 
the reproductive health context—as, indeed, in many other contexts.
 
47 “[T]o 
the extent that judges entertain any of the prevailing stereotypes of outsider 
women [involved in maternal–fetal conflicts, for example,] their attitudes 
make it that much easier for them to minimize the health and autonomy 
interests of the women, while accepting the doctors’ assessments as 
accurate.”48 Indeed, a substantial body of literature in the fields of medicine, 
ethics, and social science indicates the failure of the current structure of 
informed consent law and other aspects of the health care system in general 
to guarantee dignified, high–quality medical treatment to minority patients, 
due to a failure to take important cultural factors into account when 
communicating medical information.49
Finally, it is perhaps relevant that, despite the medical language of 
Roe and Doe, the Supreme Court has generally treated contraception and 
abortion, in cases claiming a right to access that particular medical 
procedure, differently from most other claims of right to access medical 
treatment. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the important 
 
                                                 
45 Id. at 564 (“Viewing the process as pathological, seeking to minimize risks to 
the fetus at all costs, and assuming that mothers are, and should be, self-sacrificing, [doctors] 
base their ‘scientific’ judgments on contested factual assumptions and value choices.”). 
46 Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s 
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 451, 454–55, 471–78 (2000). 
47 Ehrenreich, supra note 43, at 519–30. 
48 Id. at 565. Professor Ehrenreich nonetheless documents the way in which 
privileged women, too, are subtly subordinated by medical discourse and medical authority. 
Id. at 530–32. 
49 Dayna Bowen Matthew, Race, Religion, and Informed Consent—Lessons from 
Social Science, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 150, 156–60 (2008). 
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constitutional right at stake in the cases touching on contraception and 
abortion by applying heightened scrutiny and a non–deferential stance to 
the government’s view of the medical facts, but most other cases dealing 
with plaintiffs’ claims of a right to access a particular medical treatment are 
treated quite differently. When patients seek to access cannabis or 
unapproved experimental drugs, for example, their claims of a right to 
protect their health and access appropriate medical treatment are quickly 
dismissed, with courts applying little scrutiny and sweeping deference to 
the government’s view.50
Thus, by the time of its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,
 Because reproductive rights–related autonomy 
claims receive more careful consideration from courts than claims of a right 
to access other medical interventions, it is not surprising that feminist 
scholars and other commentators have tended to view reproductive rights as 
distinct from, and unrelated to, other health–care issues in constitutional 
doctrine. 
51 the Supreme Court had clearly moved away from the medical 
model of abortion and the associated primacy of the physician’s judgment 
and role. Indeed, in Casey, the Court went so far as to assert that, not only 
was the doctor–patient relationship not entitled to any special solicitude in 
the abortion context, but “[w]hatever constitutional status the doctor–patient 
relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative 
of the woman’s position.”52 It continued, “[t]he doctor–patient relation does 
not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the 
abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to 
physical autonomy.”53
C. Cr itiquing the Critiques of the Medical Model 
 
The feminist critiques of the medical model of abortion are, no 
doubt, both valid and compelling. Without, therefore, intending to minimize 
them, this Article suggests that these critiques may be based in part on a 
historical view of medicine as male dominated and uninterested in women’s 
autonomy that is no longer entirely accurate but that continues to exert a 
                                                 
50 The argument made in this paragraph is set forth at greater length in B. Jessie 
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two 
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277 (2007). 
51 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
52 Id. at 884. 
53 Id. 
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somewhat excessive influence on reproductive rights scholarship and legal 
practice. Indeed, it may be time to revive the latent strand of reproductive 
rights jurisprudence that envisions abortion as a medical procedure among 
others and vindicates a form of negative right to health. 
One reason for rejecting, or at least sidelining, the criticisms of the 
medical model of abortion is that it is based in part on a state of affairs that 
no longer exists. Although it may have been reasonable to describe 
medicine as predominantly male54 until fairly recently, or to assert that 
abortion politics were about “[m]en interested in establishing their 
professional authority over women’s role in reproduction encourag[ing] 
other men to assert their political authority over women’s role in 
reproduction,”55 statistics now indicate that women have been entering the 
field of obstetrics and gynecology at a substantially higher rate than men for 
several years.56
More importantly, critics’ concerns about women’s autonomy and 
empowerment within the physician–patient relationship may now be 
overstated, given the tremendous changes in professional beliefs, attitudes, 
and orientation toward patient autonomy that has been driven largely by the 
discipline of bioethics. Indeed, the era in which Roe was decided, the 1970s, 
was precisely the era in which patient autonomy became a primary focus of 
medical ethics.
 
57 This is not to suggest that concerns about women’s 
autonomy in the doctor–patient relationship have disappeared entirely; 
those concerns certainly persist, and they are particularly acute with respect 
to poor and minority women.58
                                                 
54 Ehrenreich, supra note 43, at 538. 
 But it does seem fair to point out that there 
is now an entire field of study known as bioethics—influential in both legal 
55 Siegel, supra note 36, at 318. 
56 See, e.g., Susan E. Gerber & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, The Evolving Gender Gap in 
General Obstetrics and Gynecology, 195 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1427, 1427 
(2006) (noting that the proportion of women obstetrics and gynecology (ob-gyn) residents 
rose from forty-four percent in 1989 to seventy-four percent in 2002). 
57 See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, Autonomy’s Temporary Triumph, 14 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 38, 38 (Oct. 1984). 
58 See, e.g., ALEXANDRA DUNDAS TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL 
CONFLICT BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 77–97 (1989); Khiara H. Bridges, 
Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the Reproductive Lives of Poor Black and Racially 
Subjugated Women, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. PAGE (2009); Ehrenreich, supra note 43; 
Oberman, supra note 46; cf. Veatch, supra note 57, at 39 (acknowledging the limitations of 
the concept of patient autonomy for addressing concerns about equality in health care). 
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and medical education and discourse—that is largely centered on increasing 
respect for patient autonomy and encouraging informed decision–making.59 
That field has largely grown as an academic discipline in the years since 
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.60 It is worth recalling as well that the 
American Medical Association (AMA), which had in the past been a 
prominent force in achieving the criminalization of abortion, now supports 
abortion rights.61 The AMA even filed an amicus curiae brief in the 
Supreme Court on behalf of Planned Parenthood in Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of Northern New England,62 which involved a federal 
constitutional challenge to a state law requiring parental notification for 
minors seeking abortions.63
                                                 
59 See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 57–112 (5th ed. 2001); Carl Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 411, 413 (2006) (describing the centrality of patient autonomy to bioethics 
and stating that “[b]ioethics was born a reform movement” with “medical imperialism” as its 
enemy). 
 In other words, the medical profession is not the 
same male–dominated, patriarchal, and paternalistic profession it was in the 
nineteenth century; bioethics, feminism, and the increased entry of women 
into the profession have changed and continue to change the way both 
patients and physicians approach the medical decision–making process. To 
the extent that challenges remain, there is no reason to believe that the same 
60 The Hastings Center, one of the most important and well-respected bioethics 
research centers in the United States, was founded in 1969, and the Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics at Georgetown University, which bills itself as “the world’s oldest and most 
comprehensive academic bioethics center” was founded in 1971. See The Kennedy Institute 
of Ethics, http://kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009); The Hastings 
Center, http://www.thehastingscenter.org/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). Beauchamp and 
Childress’s seminal bioethics text was first published in 1979. See TOM. L. BEAUCHAMP & 
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1st. Ed. 1979). 
61 For a history of the American Medical Association’s opposition to abortion, see 
Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 36, at 285–86. For the AMA’s current position on abortion, 
see Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 
(2006) (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL 2646471, at 2 (noting that the AMA does not “support or 
oppose abortion” but “believe[s] that this issue is a matter for physicians to decide 
individually, based on personal values and beliefs” and supports the “integrity and 
confidentiality of the patient/physician relationship and the ethical duty of physicians to 
respect and advocate for their patients’ personal autonomy”). 
62 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
63 Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 61. 
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tools that have been used to transform the profession until now are no 
longer up to the task. 
It may therefore be time to return to some of the premises from 
which reproductive rights jurisprudence began; in particular, it may be time 
to consider whether the right to choose abortion might, in part, be 
understood as an aspect of a constitutional right to make medical treatment 
decisions in consultation with a physician. Although such a right is not 
currently firmly or explicitly recognized in American constitutional 
doctrine, Part III of this Article argues that, reading between the lines, there 
is clear precedent for recognizing its existence as an aspect of substantive 
due process.64
II. REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: 
EXAMPLES FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND CANADA 
 The cases discussed next, in Part II, may provide useful 
models for understanding how such a right might be understood. 
This Part describes two decisions by the highest courts of South 
Africa and Canada and considers how the right to health is understood by 
each, as well as how such a right, which has largely been discussed outside 
the abortion context, can apply to abortion. These two cases provide 
particularly interesting and useful examples for thinking about the right to 
health for several reasons. First, they are noteworthy in that, although both 
decisions come from countries that grant substantially broader health care 
entitlements to their citizens than the U.S., these cases largely embrace the 
negative concept of a right against government interference with 
autonomous medical treatment decisions, rather than the positive concept of 
a right to subsidized medical services. They are thus more easily 
assimilated to U.S. constitutional jurisprudence than decisions establishing 
a positive right might be.65
                                                 
64 See infra Part III.A.; see also Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32 (discussing the wide 
variety of cases in which courts have held or assumed that individuals have a constitutional 
right to protect their health in the form of a “substantive-due-process right to make medical 
decisions without unwarranted government interference”). 
 Moreover, both courts rely on a concept of the 
65 This Article emphasizes the negative quality of the health care rights recognized 
in the Canadian and South African cases because it is incontrovertible that courts in the 
United States are extremely unlikely to recognize a positive constitutional right to access 
health care services in the near future. U.S. constitutional law has never recognized 
constitutional rights as positive rights, and any move toward positive rights in the near future 
is virtually impossible to imagine. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, supra note 9, at 
1392–94. This Article does not argue that abortion rights should be understood as an aspect 
of the human right to health contained in instruments of international law, as others have 
argued. See generally supra note 2; Soohoo & Stolz, supra note 3, at 479–98 (arguing that 
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right to health that is related to, and includes, the right to access abortion. 
As such, they demonstrate how a negative right to health that includes a 
right to access abortion might be conceptualized. Finally, both cases are 
recent cases that garnered substantial attention both in their countries of 
origin and in the United States. As such, they may represent rising trends in 
judicial thinking about health care and the nature of health care rights.66
Both South Africa and Canada have recognized in some form a 
“right to health” in ways that bear partly, though not exclusively, on the 
abortion right. South Africa has explicitly guaranteed a constitutional right 
to health that is understood, at least in part, as a positive entitlement to 
health care, including reproductive health services. Canada, on the other 
hand, has not gone so far as to recognize a positive constitutional right to 
health care.
 
67 In the recent case of Chaoulli v. Québec, however, various 
Justices read both the Charter of the province of Québec and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to guarantee a negative right to 
noninterference with an individual’s access to health care services.68 The 
right identified by the Court in the Québec Charter has a strong affiliation to 
the right of personal security in the Canadian Charter on which Regina v. 
Morgentaler,69
                                                                                                                 
advocates can use human rights, including the right to health, to support domestic change in 
the reproductive rights arena). Rather, this Article argues that courts can recognize, and to 
some extent already have recognized, a negative right to noninterference in medical 
treatment decisions. See infra Part III.A; Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32. This Article 
contends, moreover, that abortion rights may be placed usefully within that framework. 
Some commentators nonetheless maintain that a positive right to health care can and should 
be recognized in the United States. See, e.g., Jennifer Prah Ruger, Governing Health, 121 
HARV. L. REV. F. 43, 44 (2008) (arguing that “a right to health care need not, indeed cannot, 
be framed in an absolute libertarian framework of wholly individualistic rights against the 
State” but rather must include a conception of obligation on the part of both state and non-
state actors to help furnish the necessary public good of health care). 
 the original Canadian decision recognizing a constitutional 
66 See generally Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 
487, 491–97 (2005) (discussing transnational dialogue among courts as a cooperative and 
synergistic enterprise). 
67 The Canada Health Act, which provides federal funding for comprehensive 
universal health care to be administered by the provinces, constitutes a positive statutory 
right to health care, however. Canada Health Act, R.S.C., c. C-6, s. 7 (1985). See generally 
Puneet K. Sandhu, Comment, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States 
Learn from Foreign Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1181–
82 (2007). 
68 Chaoulli v. Québec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.). 
69 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.). 
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right to choose abortion, was founded. The negative right to health 
recognized in South Africa and Canada is thus reminiscent of the medical 
model within American reproductive rights jurisprudence. It may therefore 
be fruitful to consider the South African and Canadian cases in greater 
depth in order to see how an incipient negative healthcare right in American 
constitutional law could be further developed and applied to abortion rights. 
A. Minister  of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 
Section 27 of the South African Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees 
a “right to have access to . . . health care services, including reproductive 
health care.”70 A fair amount of recent scholarship has focused on South 
Africa’s enforcement of the right to health, among others, as positive rights, 
which impose affirmative duties on the government to take reasonable 
measures to achieve them for all citizens equally.71 As discussed below, 
however, this Article focuses on the right to health as it is elaborated on in 
one particular case decided by the South African Constitutional Court, 
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),72
The TAC decision dealt with access to an antiretroviral drug, 
Nevirapine, which had been approved in South Africa as safe and effective 
to prevent transmission of HIV from HIV–positive mothers to their babies 
during childbirth.
 in which the 
right to health shares many of the characteristics of a negative right to 
noninterference with medical treatment decisions. 
73 The South African government had made the drug 
available to women in the public health sector on a very limited basis, 
permitting only two test sites per province to administer it.74
                                                 
70 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27. 
 According to 
the government, the decision to limit the availability of Nevirapine was 
largely due to concerns about the complexity of providing the drug in the 
71 See, e.g., Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-
Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
321 (2007); Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the 
Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
351 (2008); Mitra Ebadolahi, Note, Using Structural Interdicts and the South African 
Human Rights Commission to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights 
in South Africa, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1565 (2008). 
72 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
73 Id. ¶ 10. 
74 Id. 
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context of a comprehensive treatment and prevention plan for HIV–positive 
mothers and their newborns. In particular, the government was concerned 
that the efficacy of the treatment could be undermined by multiple social, 
economic, and cultural factors, such as the necessity of counseling and 
follow–up care, the expense of providing infant formula to HIV–positive 
mothers, the difficulty of persuading women to substitute that formula for 
breastfeeding, and the absence of clean water in certain parts of the country, 
which would make formula feeding riskier.75 The government also argued 
that it was concerned about the safety and efficacy of the drug as well as 
about the possibility of resistance to the drug developing in the HIV–
positive mothers.76 Unmentioned in the opinion, however, is the fact that 
the South African government’s reluctance to provide access to Nevirapine 
was part of a larger program of heel–dragging in providing a nationwide 
treatment plan for HIV/AIDS, motivated by a well–known skepticism about 
the relationship between HIV and AIDS on the part of President Thabo 
Mbeki’s administration.77
The plaintiffs successfully brought suit against the Minister of 
Health and various other health officials to attain universal access to 
Nevirapine within the public health care system,
 
78 arguing that the South 
African Constitution required the government to make the drug available 
“where in the judgment of the attending medical practitioner this is 
medically indicated,” and that the drug may be beneficial even when it is 
not administered in the context of a comprehensive plan.79
                                                 
75 Id. ¶¶ 14–16; see also id. ¶¶ 51–54. The government presented evidence 
suggesting that some infants who are HIV-negative at birth become HIV-positive afterwards, 
possibly as a result of breastfeeding by the HIV-positive mother. Id. ¶ 58. 
 They relied both 
76 Id. ¶¶ 52–53. 
77 The depths of the government’s intransigence, and its roots, are fascinatingly 
recounted in William E. Forbath, Realizing a Constitutional Social Right—Cultural 
Transformation, Deep Institutional Reform, and the Roles of Advocacy and Adjudication, in 
STONES OF HOPE: AFRICAN LAWYERS USE HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY 
(Jeremy Perelman and Lucie White eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with author); 
see also Mark Heywood, Shaping, Making, and Breaking the Law in the Campaign for a 
National HIV/AIDS Treatment Plan, in DEMOCRATISING DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA (Peris Jones & Kristian Stokke eds., 2005). 
78 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 
¶¶ 18–19 (S. Afr.). 
79 Id. ¶ 18 (discussing Affidavit submitted by activists from the Treatment Action 
Campaign). Indeed, the Constitutional Court noted that “the wealth of scientific material 
produced by both sides makes plain that sero-conversion of HIV takes place in some, but not 
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on the right to health contained in Section 27 of the constitution and on 
Section 28, which guarantees children the right to certain basic goods, 
including basic health care.80
Although the plaintiffs’ claim for enforcement of the right to health 
was styled as a claim of positive right,
 
81 it shared many characteristics of a 
negative right. First, the drug had been offered to the government free of 
charge for a period of five years. Thus, “the cost of the drug itself was not a 
factor” in the government’s decision to deny access.82 Second, the 
Constitutional Court relied in part on the notion that the constitution 
imposes, “at the very least, a negative obligation placed upon the State and 
all other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right 
of access” to “health care services, including reproductive health care.”83 At 
issue in TAC was not so much the government’s affirmative obligation to 
provide a drug to those dependent on the public health care system as much 
as its obligation not to interfere with patients’ access to that drug.84
The contours of a negative right to health, consisting of a right to be 
free from government–imposed harm and to maintain a broad range of 
discretion for medical decision making by physicians and their patients, 
thus emerge from the TAC decision. While accepting the government’s 
 
                                                                                                                 
all, cases and that nevirapine thus remains to some extent efficacious in combating mother-
to-child transmission even if the mother breastfeeds her baby.” Id. ¶ 58. 
80 Id. ¶ 4 (citing S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 §§ 27(1)(a), 28(1)(c)). 
81 Cf. id. ¶ 39 (noting that the right to health in Section 27(1) of the South African 
Constitution is a right “to have ‘access’ to the services the state is obliged to provide,” which 
is limited by the reasonableness standard explicitly set forth in Section 27(2)). Professor 
William Forbath notes that the case was designed to vindicate a positive constitutional right, 
although it the plaintiffs could achieve victory if the court only recognized a negative right, 
which is precisely what the lower court did. Forbath, supra note 77, manuscript at 12. 
82 Treatment Action Campaign, (10) BCLR ¶ 48. 
83 Id. ¶ 46 (quoting Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 
2001 (1) SA 46, ¶ 34 (CC) (S. Afr.)); cf. Sandhu, supra note 67, at 1175 noting that the 
South African right to health is both a negative and a positive right); Tushnet, supra note 5, 
at 1902–08 (classifying the South African right to health as either a strong or a weak 
substantive right, depending on the case); see also Paul Nolette, Lessons Learned from the 
South African Constitutional Court: Toward a Third Way of Judicial Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 91, 107, 118 (2003) (characterizing the socio-
economic rights in the South African Constitution as “rights of access,” as opposed to “rights 
on demand,” and suggesting that they represent a “third way” between strong positive rights 
and a complete absence of positive rights). 
84 See Forbath, supra note 77, manuscript at 22. 
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view that parents were primarily responsible for affording health care to 
their children where possible, for instance, the Court emphasized that in this 
case, the government’s own “rigid and inflexible” policy was responsible 
for harming the affected children and placing their rights “in peril.”85 In 
other words, the state, at the very minimum, has an obligation not to harm 
its citizens through its health care policies. The Court also declined to defer 
to the government’s rather questionable view of the medical facts 
concerning the safety and efficacy of the drug in these particular 
circumstances, insisting that the medically appropriate course “must be left 
to health professionals to address during counseling.”86 Thus, in language 
suggestive of a right to noninterference with medical treatment decisions, 
the government was ordered to, inter alia, “[r]emove the restrictions that 
prevent [N]evirapine from being made available for the purpose of reducing 
the risk of mother–to–child transmission of HIV at public hospitals and 
clinics that are not research and training sites,” as well as to both “permit” 
and “facilitate the use of [N]evirapine . . . when in the judgment of the 
attending medical practitioner . . . this is medically indicated.”87
B. Chaoulli v. Québec 
 
1. The Chaoulli Decision 
Though it arose in a very different context, the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chaoulli v. Québec bears many similarities to the TAC 
decision with respect to the right to health. In Chaoulli v. Québec,88 the 
Court held that the province of Québec could not constitutionally prohibit 
private health insurance without running afoul of patients’ rights to physical 
inviolability. The plaintiffs, a physician and a patient, had challenged the 
constitutionality of a Québec law that prohibited Québec residents from 
taking out insurance to pay for health services in the private sector if those 
same services were available through Québec’s public health plan.89
                                                 
85 Treatment Action Campaign, (10) BCLR ¶ 78. 
 
86 Id. ¶ 128. Similarly, the plaintiffs argued that “[w]hether or not to prescribe 
Nevirapine is a matter of professional medical judgment, which can only be exercised on a 
case-by-case basis. It is not a matter which is capable of rational or appropriate decision on a 
blanket basis.” Id. ¶ 19. 
87 Id. ¶¶ 135(a), (b) (emphasis added). 
88 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.). 
89 Id. ¶¶ 1, 5. 
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Although the provincial government claimed that the prohibition was 
necessary in order to preserve the viability of the publicly financed 
universal health care system in Québec, the Court nonetheless held the law 
unconstitutional in a 4-3 opinion.90
No single rationale commanded a majority of the Court. The lead 
opinion by Justice Deschamps relied upon Section 1 of the Québec Charter 
to find the prohibition unconstitutional and therefore did not reach the 
question whether the prohibition was unconstitutional under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well.
 
91 Chief Justice MacLachlin, in a 
concurring opinion, agreed that the Québec law violated the Québec Charter 
but also relied upon Section 7 of the Canadian Charter, which protects 
Canadians’ “right to life, liberty and security of the person.”92
The two opinions in the majority shared several commonalities, 
however. Although not explicitly presented in terms of a right to health, 
both opinions viewed the prohibition on private insurance as a form of 
state–mandated harm that impermissibly interferes with the individuals’ 
rights to protect their health and life—broadly construed—through medical 
treatment. Justice Deschamps reasoned that the personal “inviolability” 
protected by Section 1 of the Québec Charter included “physical 
inviolability and mental or psychological inviolability,”
 
93 and that both of 
these were violated by the prohibition, because the long delays resulting 
from the lack of access to private sector health services led to injuries 
ranging from increased risk of morbidity or death, to severe pain, to a loss 
of quality of life.94
                                                 
90 Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 100–104. 
 Similarly, Chief Justice MacLachlin stated that the 
Québec prohibition “results in physical and psychological suffering” 
91 Id. ¶ 15; see also QUÉBEC CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS & FREEDOMS, R.S.Q., ch. 
C-12 § 1 (1977) (Can.) (“Every human being has a right to life, and to personal security, 
inviolability and freedom.”) [hereinafter QUÉBEC CHARTER]. 
92 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
ch. 11 § 7 (U.K.); Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶¶ 102, 104. 
93 In the French version, the word for inviolability is “integrité,” which may also 
be translated as “integrity.” Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, L.R.Q., ch. C-12 § 1 
(1977) (“Tout être humain a droit à la vie, ainsi qu’à la sûreté, à l’intégrité et à la liberté de 
sa personne.”). 
94 Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶¶ 41–43. Justice Deschamps also concluded that the 
prohibition could not be justified by section 9.1 of the Québec Charter, which permits limits 
on individual rights and freedoms in the interest of “democratic values, public order and the 
general well-being of the citizens of Québec.” QUÉBEC CHARTER, R.S.Q., ch. C-12 § 9.1. 
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through increased delays in accessing health care and increased health risks, 
thus violating the Section 7 right to “security of the person.”95 He added 
that “[t]he state has effectively limited access to private health care except 
for the very rich, who can afford private sector care without need of 
insurance.”96 Both opinions, then, relied upon a negative right against state–
imposed harm to health through denial of, or delay in, access to medical 
services as a violation of the right to personal security or inviolability, and 
both understood the concept of harm to health broadly, to include non–
trivial mental or psychological harm.97
Justices Binnie and Lebel, writing in dissent, disagreed with the 
majority’s holding, but the disagreement was not so fundamental as it might 
at first appear.
 
98 Although the dissenting Justices felt that the Québec law, 
as a whole, did not violate principles of fundamental justice under the 
Canadian Charter, even they acknowledged two ways that the Section 7 
right to personal security may be implicated: first, if “the public system fails 
to deliver life–saving care and an individual is simultaneously prevented 
from seeking insurance to cover the cost of that care in a private facility,” 
and second, if an individual’s medical condition will deteriorate due to a 
“lack of timely medical intervention” for which the state is responsible.99 
The dissent expressed discomfort with deciding the issue on the basis of a 
record that was somewhat sparse and abstract, however: for example, 
neither of the plaintiffs was an individual actually suffering from a medical 
problem that required immediate treatment, so the effects of the law could 
not be concretely evaluated.100 In light of this fact, the dissent declined to 
“foreclose individual patients from seeking individual relief” as plaintiffs 
alleging a violation of their Section 7 rights by the Quebec law.101
                                                 
95 Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶ 123. 
 But they 
96 Id. ¶ 106. 
97 Indeed, Justice Deschamps apparently would include “moral” harm as well. Id. 
at ¶ 41. 
98 Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶ 203. 
99 Id. ¶¶ 203, 206. 
100 Id. ¶¶ 207, 224 (“One of the difficulties in assessing the effectiveness . . . [of 
the Québec system] is that neither [of the plaintiffs] is before the Court with an actual 
medical problem.”). 
101 Id. ¶ 264 (“Judicial intervention at this level on a case-by-case basis is 
preferable to acceptance of the appellants’ global challenge to the entire single-tier health 
plan. It is important to emphasize that rejection of the appellants’ global challenge to 
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deemed a global challenge to the law—what might in U.S. law be termed a 
facial challenge—to be inappropriate in the current circumstances. Even the 
dissent in Chaoulli, then, assumed that some right to protect one’s health 
both existed and might be violated by the private health insurance 
prohibition.102
2. Chaoulli and the Right to Access Abortion 
 
Both majority opinions in Chaoulli drew on the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s decision in Regina v. Morgentaler103—the case that first struck 
down a criminal prohibition on abortions under the Canadian Charter—in 
order to flesh out its reasoning regarding the unconstitutionality, under 
Section 7, of denying access to a medically indicated procedure in such a 
way as to cause serious physical or psychological harm. For example, in 
demonstrating that the Québec law did not comport with fundamental 
justice, Chief Justice MacLachlin noted that “rules that endanger health 
arbitrarily do not comply with the principles of fundamental justice,” citing 
Morgentaler as an example of a case in which “the rule against arbitrariness 
may be implicated in the particular context of access to health care.”104 She 
also cited Morgentaler for the proposition that “delays in obtaining medical 
treatment which affect patients physically and psychologically trigger the 
protection of Section 7 of the Charter.”105
                                                                                                                 
Québec’s health plan would not foreclose individual patients from seeking individual relief 
tailored to their individual circumstances.”). Interestingly, the approach taken by the 
majority in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), is similar to that advocated by the 
dissent in Chaoulli. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 162–68 (holding that medical issues could not 
properly be resolved in the context of a facial challenge to the federal Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act but leaving the door open to an as-applied challenge). 
 Justice Deschamps’s opinion 
102 The Chaoulli decision has been heavily criticized for its holding, and 
particularly for the likely harmful effects of that decision on the Canadian public health care 
system and Canadian health policy. See, e.g., Joan M. Gilmour, Fallout from Chaoulli: Is It 
Time to Find Cover?, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 327 (2006); Martha Jackman, The Last Line of 
Defence for [Which?] Citizens?: Accountability, Equality, and the Right to Health in 
Chaoulli, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 349, 363–72 (2006). This Article expresses no opinion as 
to the wisdom of that holding in the Canadian context or its broader implications. Rather, 
this Article seeks to mine the opinion for its perspective on the meaning of a negative right to 
health, which, despite its potentially undesirable effects in Canada, would fit comfortably 
within U.S. constitutional law and the already privatized U.S. health care system. 
103 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.). 
104 Chaoulli, S.C.R. ¶ 133. 
105 Id. ¶ 118. 
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similarly relied on Morgentaler for the notion that state–caused delays in 
access to health care must be understood to implicate the right to personal 
inviolability, regardless of whether the resulting harm is mental or 
physical.106
Indeed, in Morgentaler itself, the lead opinion described at length 
the problematic effects of the delays experienced by women seeking 
therapeutic abortions, including the greater risk of complications that 
accompany later abortions and the accompanying psychological and 
emotional distress. This possibility of physical and emotional distress 
imposed by the state’s bureaucracy led Chief Justice Dickson and Justice 
Lamer to conclude that “in the case of abortion the implications of any 
delay . . . are potentially devastating.”
 
107
Generally speaking, the constitutional right to security of the 
person must include some protection from state interference 
when a person’s life or health is in danger . . . . If a rule of 
criminal law precludes a person from obtaining appropriate 
medical treatment when his or her life or health is in danger, then 
the state has intervened and this intervention constitutes a 
violation of that man’s or that woman’s security of the person. 
“Security of the person” must include a right of access to medical 
treatment for a condition representing a danger to life or health 
without fear of criminal sanction.
 The concurring opinion of Justice 
Beetz, while less focused specifically on delay, was even more explicit in 
drawing a connection between the right to access therapeutic abortion and 
the right to government noninterference in health care decisions: 
108
The connection between reproductive rights and a negative right to 
protect one’s health is thus explicit in Morgentaler.
 
109
                                                 
106 Id. ¶ 43; cf. Rodriguez v. Attorney General, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶ 21 (Can.) 
(“[T]he judgments of this Court in Morgentaler can be seen to encompass a notion of 
personal autonomy involving, at the very least, control over one’s bodily integrity free from 
state interference and freedom from state-imposed psychological and emotional stress.”). 
 Chaoulli highlights 
this strand of the Morgantaler opinion and further suggests ways in which it 
may be applicable to reproductive rights. 
107 Morgentaler, S.C.R. ¶ 58. 
108 Id. ¶ 90. 
109 Cf. Joanna N. Erdman, In the Back Alleys of Health Care: Abortion, Equality, 
and Community in Canada, 56 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1105–06 (2007) (noting that Morgentaler, 
in contrast to Roe v. Wade, relied not on a liberty interest but on the right to security of the 
person to hold the criminal abortion prohibitions unconstitutional). 
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B. Summary: Modeling a Right to Health 
Both the South African Constitutional Court’s decision in TAC and 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Chaoulli v. Québec outline a 
right to health that may be described more precisely as a right to 
noninterference by the government with individuals’ access to appropriate 
health care. These cases and their reasoning are described here in the hope 
that they may provide models for conceptualizing such a right within 
American substantive due process jurisprudence, which may include the 
right to access reproductive health services. To that end, this Section briefly 
summarizes the key aspects of the health care rights elaborated in TAC and 
Chaoulli. 
First, and fundamentally, the health care rights in TAC and Chaoulli 
may be conceptualized as negative rights to freedom from government 
interference and not as potentially more problematic positive 
socioeconomic rights to access particular public goods. They are thus 
distinct from the sort of government entitlements that some scholars 
advocate and that some hope to enforce through international human rights 
mechanisms.110 As negative rights, they may fit within the general 
framework of U.S. constitutional law. They therefore escape the criticisms 
commonly leveled at positive rights. For example, negative rights do not 
require courts to interfere with legislatively determined budget priorities, 
nor do they raise difficult enforcement issues or the specter of inter-branch 
warfare.111
In addition, TAC and Chaoulli both suggest, in broad strokes, how 
one might describe and operationalize such a negative healthcare right. In 
both cases, the right at issue is broadly conceived as a right to be free from 
state–imposed harm, including harm resulting from administrative and 
bureaucratic regulations that pose obstacles to obtaining medically 
appropriate care. The Canadian case, in particular, emphasizes the 
 Compared with robust positive rights, negative rights may be 
vindicated on the cheap. 
                                                 
110 See generally Tamara Friesen, The Right to Health Care, 9 HEALTH L.J. 205 
(2001); Erika R. George, Virginity Testing and South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Crisis: Beyond 
Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism Toward Health Capabilities, 96 CAL. L. REV. 
1447, 1500–13 (2008) (discussing possibilities for enforcement of both the international and 
South African positive right to health and its possible application to the problem of virginity 
testing); Klein, supra note 71, at 352 (arguing that some judicial enforcement of positive 
socio-economic rights is both possible and desirable); Ruger, supra note 65. . 
111 See generally Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1895–97 (briefly summarizing the 
principal objections to positive rights among American constitutional law scholars). 
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phenomenon of state–caused delay in obtaining health services as an injury 
in itself.112
Both cases also conceive of health care broadly. The Canadian case 
explicitly requires access to health care as a protection against significant 
state–imposed mental, emotional, and psychological harm, as well as 
physical harm.
 
113 Because TAC involved a concrete case of physical 
suffering, it unsurprisingly focused on physical, rather than psychological, 
harm. Still, the South African case does suggest a large role for physician 
discretion, rather than “inflexible” state mandates, to determine precisely 
what sort of medical care is indicated.114 In both cases, the broad 
understanding of health and medical appropriateness was accompanied by a 
disinclination to defer to the government’s view of the medical facts. This 
left a bigger role for physicians and patients to determine the nature, scope, 
and necessity of the medical intervention.115
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both cases recognize a 
connection between the negative right to health and reproductive rights. The 
South African case arose in the context of delivering reproductive health 
services, specifically, treatment to avoid HIV transmission from mother to 
infant during childbirth. Moreover, the Court relied upon a constitutional 
provision that explicitly includes reproductive health care within the scope 
of the right to health care.
 
116
                                                 
112 Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 ¶¶ 43, 118 (Can.); cf. Morgentaler, 
S.C.R. ¶¶ 28–34; see also Erdman, supra note 109, at 1106–15. 
 Chaoulli, by contrast, arose in a context that 
appears to be very much removed from reproductive rights, namely, a 
general provincial prohibition on private health insurance for most medical 
services. Yet, Chaoulli simultaneously drew on the Canadian Supreme 
113 But see Erdman, supra note 109, at 1141–48 (suggesting that some Canadian 
provinces have embraced too narrow a conception of medical necessity with respect to 
funding abortion). 
114 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 
¶ 128 (S. Afr.) (stating that the necessity of formula feeding in any particular case where 
Nevirapine is administered “must be left to health professionals to address during 
counseling”); id. ¶ 135(3)(b) (ordering the government to “make [Nevirapine] available . . . 
at hospitals and clinics when in the judgment of the attending medical practitioner acting in 
consultation with the medical superintendent of the facility concerned this is medically 
indicated”). 
115 Id. ¶¶ 57-66; Chaoulli, ¶¶ 85–98; cf. Hill, supra note 50, at 332–41 (arguing 
that deference to legislatures is inappropriate where medical or scientific facts are 
concerned). 
116 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2, § 27(1). 
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Court’s reasoning in Regina v. Morgentaler to describe the contours of the 
right at issue in that case.117 Thus, reproductive rights in many ways fit 
comfortably under the rubric of the negative health care right described 
herein. The right to access abortion is clearly one aspect of the negative 
right to health.118
Of course, a right to health care, even a negative one, cannot be 
unlimited, and it is not unlimited under the Canadian Charter or South 
African Constitution. Rather, both constitutions contain provisions that limit 
the extent of individual rights. The Section 7 right to security of the person 
may be limited in ways that accord with “the principles of fundamental 
justice.”
 
119 This provision has been understood as requiring balancing the 
interests of the individual and the state.120 Similarly, the South African 
Constitutional Court has made it clear that health care rights are limited by 
reasonableness considerations.121
                                                 
117 Chaoulli, ¶ ¶43, 118. 
 Nonetheless, both countries recognize a 
relatively robust constitutional right to access medical treatment, at least 
when such a right does not place significant claims on government financial 
resources. Such a constitutional right is broad enough in both countries to 
encompass a right to reproductive health care. 
118 Cf. John A. Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment and the Right to 
Health Care, 36 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 15, 15 (2006) (arguing that a negative right to health 
care “anchors a woman’s use of abortion and contraception, and underlies the great 
deference ordinarily accorded doctors and patients to pursue medical care”). But cf. Erdman, 
supra note 109, at 1093 (2007) (asserting that under Canadian law, “[a]bortion can be a 
health service like any other, but it is not,” because access and funding for abortion 
procedures are restricted in practice). Indeed, the project of bringing reproductive rights 
under the rubric of a negative health care right may well indirectly support the broader 
feminist project of assimilating reproductive health care, in all its manifestations, to the 
international right to health and basic health care. 
119 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
ch. 11, §7 (U.K.) (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.”). 
120 Rodriguez v. Attorney General, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶¶ 31–35 (Can.). 
121 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 
¶¶ 67–68 (S. Afr.) (citing Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 
(1) SA 46 (CC) ¶ 44 (S. Afr.)); Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 
(CC) ¶ 42 (S. Afr.) (Madala, J., concurring) (“[T]he guarantees of the Constitution are not 
absolute but may be limited in one way or another.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 4, at 4; 
Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in 
Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 169 (2008) (discussing balancing with respect to 
the right to health under the South African Constitution). 
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III. TOWARD A RIGHT TO HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 
In describing several features of a negative right to health as it may 
be understood in South African and Canadian constitutional jurisprudence, 
this Article does not necessarily make the claim that the U.S. Supreme 
Court is likely to draw on foreign legal sources in developing a new right 
under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court is notoriously 
hesitant to expand the scope of substantive due process.122 Moreover, 
explicit borrowing from other countries’ jurisprudence is both unlikely for 
the foreseeable future and possibly a perilous matter, given that the project 
of determining the suitability of adopting aspects of another nation’s legal 
system is mired in practical and conceptual difficulty.123
Rather, this Article makes two more modest claims. First, it argues 
that a negative right of noninterference with medical treatment decisions 
has already been recognized to some extent within our own constitutional 
jurisprudence.
 
124 As such, it may be possible and useful for reproductive 
rights advocates to foreground this doctrine in combination with the other 
legal arguments that are usually made in reproductive rights cases and 
scholarship. This notion of “the right to health” may also be deployed to 
frame new legal challenges to restrictions on abortion rights, particularly 
with respect to certain kinds of regulations that are generally upheld under 
current doctrine.125
Second, this Article argues that advocates and scholars interested in 
achieving greater protection for reproductive rights in the United States 
should look to the negative right to health outlined in the Canadian and 
 Because they are easily assimilated into the negative 
structure of American constitutional rights and closely related to the 
protection of reproductive rights in their respective countries, the Chaoulli 
and TAC cases suggest the contours of the health care right and the lines 
along which an argument relying upon that right might be made. 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due 
Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 428–29, 430 (2006) (noting 
courts’ hesitance to recognize new constitutional substantive due process rights). 
123 See Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative 
Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325 (1998) 
(examining the problems associated with “constitutional borrowing or lending”). 
124 See Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32. See generally Robertson, supra note 118 
(discussing the negative right to health); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited 
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1824 (2007) 
(arguing that there is a constitutional “right to defend oneself using medical care”). 
125 See infra Part III.B. 
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South African decisions as a potential additional rhetorical framework for 
talking about reproductive rights. The negative right to health will not 
necessarily expand access to reproductive health care for women who lack 
it, nor will it inevitably protect the core of Roe v. Wade. It should therefore 
be a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, the other ways in which 
courts and scholars currently view reproductive rights. 
A. Locating the Negative Right to Health 
The traces of a negative right to health—that is, a right to make 
medical treatment decisions without government interference—run through 
a long line of Supreme Court and lower court cases. Elsewhere, it has been 
argued at length that despite a significant degree of confusion in Supreme 
Court case law and a lack of explicit recognition, the existence of such a 
right can be inferred.126 This Article will only summarize that argument 
here. In so doing, however, this Article acknowledges that the negative 
constitutional right to health is not one to which courts explicitly refer or 
which has formed the basis of major Supreme Court holdings. Instead, it is 
a strain that intersects and overlaps with other rights in a wide range of 
substantive due process cases. Its existence, while implicit, cannot simply 
be ignored or explained away, because some Supreme Court holdings—
particularly in the abortion context, but elsewhere as well—are almost 
impossible to explain without it.127
Thus, while it may initially sound novel, the right to protect one’s 
health has long made appearances in our constitutional jurisprudence; 
indeed, some have argued that the right finds its roots in the common–law 
right of self–defense. Professor Eugene Volokh, for example, has recently 
argued that there is a right to “medical self–defense,” which may be defined 
as “a right to defend oneself using medical care.”
 
128
                                                 
126 See Hill, supra note 50, at 329-32 (arguing that “the Supreme Court has already 
recognized a substantive-due-process right to make medical treatment choices,” although 
that the courts have not always embraced that right”). 
 Arguably, there is no 
127 See infra text accompanying notes 128-148. 
128 Volokh, supra note 124, at 1824. Given the long pedigree and fundamental 
quality of this assumed right to protect one’s life and health, some have argued that even if 
Roe v. Wade were overruled, some constitutional limitations would likely apply to states’ 
ability to outlaw abortions needed to prevent serious damage to one’s health. Richard H. 
Fallon, If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 626 (2007). Professor Fallon argues that these questions would arise 
under even mere rationality review of abortion legislation. He does not, however, argue that 
there is a specific constitutional right to access medical treatment. Id.; see also Michael C. 
Dorf, The Supreme Court’s Surprisingly Unanimous Abortion Decision: A Parting Gift for 
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way to understand the requirement that abortion regulations must contain an 
exception to protect against harm to a woman’s health other than as a 
statement of the negative right to health.129 This concept was first 
announced in Roe v. Wade, but the Court has consistently adhered to it 
through Stenberg v. Carhart and still assumed its validity in Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood and Gonzales v. Carhart.130 Indeed, this right to a 
health exception—or the right to noninterference by government in a 
woman’s decision to protect her health through an abortion—applies even 
post-viability, after the government interest in the fetus has become 
sufficiently compelling to override the woman’s interest in personal 
autonomy and reproductive choice.131 The health exception requirement 
therefore does not emerge solely from the right to procreative choice, nor is 
it even clearly related to that right. The right to seek a life or health–
preserving medical procedure appears to be an independent constitutional 
command, having little to do with the right to make autonomous decisions 
about childbirth and other intensely personal matters.132




                                                                                                                 
Justice O’Connor?, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Jan. 30, 2006, 
http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/20060130.html (arguing that a minor woman “has a 
constitutional right to be free of state regulation that effectively subjects her to a serious risk 
of losing a limb,” and that even if Roe v. Wade were overruled, it would remain a genuine 
constitutional question whether an abortion ban that lacks a health exception would be 
constitutional). 
 which held unconstitutional a state law requiring 
physicians to use the abortion method most likely to preserve the life and 
health of a viable fetus if that method was not significantly riskier for the 
woman, the Supreme Court explained in no uncertain terms that the state 
129 Volokh, supra note 124, at 1824–26; see also Hill, supra note 50, at 329–32. 
130 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood 
of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) ; 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 164-65 (1973). 
131 Volokh, supra note 124, at 1824–26. Professor John Robertson has advocated 
for the existence of a negative right to health care services and has also, like Volokh, 
explicitly linked that right to “a legal tradition of lawful self-defense and Supreme Court 
precedents about the importance of protecting life over claims to end it.” Robertson, supra 
note 118, at 16; see also John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”: 
Constitutional Issues in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7–15. 
132 See infra text accompanying notes 133-140. 
133 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
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cannot “require the mother to bear an increased medical risk in order to 
save her viable fetus.”134 The Tenth Circuit echoed the Thornburgh Court 
by holding a similar statute unconstitutional, concluding, even after the 
Supreme Court’s modification of abortion law in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, that “the woman’s health must be the physician’s ‘paramount 
consideration.’”135
Stenberg v. Carhart (the first “partial–birth” abortion case) 
represents the most robust recognition of the negative right to health.
 
136 In 
Stenberg, the Court struck down a Nebraska law banning the abortion 
procedure referred to as “D&X” in part because it lacked a health 
exception.137 The Court recognized that the purpose of the law was not fetal 
preservation; rather, the law was simply aimed at preventing the use of one 
abortion method that the state found repugnant but that medical experts 
deemed safest for some women.138 The effect of the ban on D&X would not 
be to prevent particular women from obtaining abortions, but rather to 
require them to obtain abortions by a riskier method. As such, Stenberg did 
not revolve around the right to choose abortion per se, but rather focused on 
the right to protect one’s health by choosing the method by which the 
abortion would be performed. In striking down the Nebraska ban, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that alternative procedures were available but 
nonetheless held that the Constitution forbids imposing the “significant 
health risks” on women that were mandated by this particular ban.139 By 
vindicating a woman’s right to choose the safest abortion procedure for her, 
Stenberg may be understood as upholding a right against government 
interference in medical treatment decisions.140
                                                 
134 Id. at 769; see also Northland Family Planning Clinic v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 
339-40 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 
135 Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (per curiam). 
136 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
137 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 929–31. 
138 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934–36 (discussing the health-related findings of the 
District Court); cf. id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that “this law does not save 
any fetus from destruction”). 
139 Id. at 931. 
140 Id. at 936–38; see also Hill, supra note 50, at 291–92. 
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The Court’s more recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart141 
significantly cut back on the scope of Stenberg’s holding. Without 
overruling Stenberg, the Court in Gonzales nonetheless upheld a federal ban 
on the D&X procedure, even though that ban, like the Nebraska law at issue 
in Stenberg, lacked a health exception and therefore imposed risks on 
women who needed the procedure to protect their health.142 The Court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims because it felt that a facial challenge was 
inappropriate in this particular set of circumstances: the statute had not yet 
been applied, there were disputes as to the relevant medical facts, and no 
plaintiff was presenting an actual medical need for the procedure.143
It would nonetheless be inaccurate to say that the Court did away 
with Stenberg’s holding altogether and the negative right to health. The 
Court continued to recognize that abortion restrictions that impose 
significant health risks on women are unconstitutional; indeed, it clearly 
stated that “[t]he prohibition in the Act would be unconstitutional, under 




Outside the abortion context, the recognition of the right has been 
less consistent, although several cases suggest the existence of some sort of 
right to protect one’s health, often accompanied by a willingness to leave to 
the patient and his or her physician the question of how best to do so. For 
example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
 If one takes the Court’s language at face value, 
it seems the Court rejected the challenge because of its procedural posture. 
It appeared to leave intact the underlying substantive doctrine forbidding 
the government from imposing significant health risks on women through 
abortion restrictions. Thus, Gonzales does not undermine the notion that the 
negative right to health—the right to protect one’s health through seeking 
medical care without government interference—has been consistently 
recognized in abortion case law. 
145
                                                 
141 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 which upheld a compulsory 
142 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155–56. 
143 Id. at 166–68. 
144 Id. at 161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 
320, 320 (2006)); cf. David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future 
of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (arguing that Gonzales “has had and likely will 
continue to have far more modest consequences than many critics and commentators initially 
proclaimed”). 
145 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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vaccination law and is often seen as emblematic of courts’ willingness to 
allow public health needs to override individual rights, the Court 
nonetheless suggested that individuals have a right to protect their health 
against state–imposed harm from required vaccines.146 Additionally, in 
Whalen v. Roe,147 the Court spoke in dicta of the “right to decide 
independently, with the advice of [a] physician, to acquire and use needed 
medication.”148
Lower courts have recognized the right on occasion as well. In 
Andrews v. Ballard, the district court, in striking down a law prohibiting 
non–physicians from practicing acupuncture, stated that the “decision to 
obtain or reject medical treatment” was a fundamental right that could be 
analogized to the privacy right recognized in Roe.
 
149 Similarly, the Fifth 
Circuit announced in the pre–Griswold case of England v. Louisiana Board 
of Medical Examiners that the plaintiffs could challenge a law prohibiting 
the practice of chiropractic medicine on due process grounds, asserting that 
“the State cannot deny to any individual the right to exercise a reasonable 
choice in the method of treatment of his ills.”150 More recently in 2006, the 
D.C. Circuit held that individuals had a substantive due process right to 
access an experimental cancer drug that had passed only the initial stage of 
FDA review.151
                                                 
146 Id. at 39 (asserting that a mandatory vaccination statute would have to provide 
exceptions in cases where the vaccination would likely result in death or serious harm to 
health); see also State v. Hay, 35 S.E. 459, 461 (N.C. 1900) (noting that a health exception to 
a mandatory vaccination law was required). 
 Although that ruling was subsequently vacated by the en 
banc court, even that court left open the possibility that government 
147 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
148 Id. at 603 (upholding a New York statute requiring disclosure of the names of 
patients receiving prescriptions for certain drugs to the state health department against 
constitutional challenge). Other cases cut precisely in the opposite direction, suggesting that 
no right to medical autonomy exists. See Hill, supra note 50, at 284–86. This Article argues 
that courts’ unwillingness to recognize such a right in some contexts has been largely (and 
wrongly) created by their tendency to defer in reflexive fashion to government claims of 
protecting public health. Id. at 286. 
149 Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
150 Eng. v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 259 F.2d 626, 627 (5th Cir. 1958). 
151 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 
470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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interference with individuals’ access to medical treatment might implicate a 
fundamental right.152
At the same time, a number of cases can be found that hold or 
suggest that no negative right to health exists. These cases range from the 
lower court cases denying access to laetrile and medical marijuana,
 
153 to 
another case denying access to an experimental cancer drug.154
Of course, as with any constitutional right, the right to 
noninterference in health care decision making is not unlimited. Case law 
suggests that the right may be limited by the need to protect the public from 
an imminent threat or by other important government interests.
 It cannot 
therefore be asserted without hesitation that the negative right to health is 
on firm footing in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. It is nonetheless 
undeniable that cases both within and outside the abortion context rely on 
such a right. Although it is not often explicitly articulated as such, the 
notion of a right to seek medical treatment without government interference 
explains and renders coherent much of the substantive due process 
jurisprudence just discussed. 
155 Thus, 
while the Supreme Court’s recognition of a right to health in the abortion 
cases has been particularly robust, it has declined to recognize a right to 
assisted suicide.156 Although a right to choose assisted suicide would not 
exactly be a right to protect one’s health, a right to seek medical 
intervention to end one’s life would be encompassed within a broad 
understanding of the negative right to health. Yet, Glucksberg does not 
entirely undermine the notion that such a right exists. First, Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Glucksberg, which provided the 
necessary fifth vote, declined to hold that there was no right to seek medical 
intervention to end physical suffering.157
                                                 
152 Id. at 701–03. 
 Instead, it insisted that even if 
there were such a right, the state’s interest in preserving life was sufficiently 
153 See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(laetrile); United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102–03 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998) (medical marijuana). 
154 See, e.g., Smith v. Shalala, 954 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (cancer drug). 
155 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–26 (1905). 
156 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723. 
157 Id. at 736–38. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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strong to overcome it.158 Moreover, a majority of the Justices in Glucksberg 
suggested that there may be a constitutional substantive due process right to 
receive palliative medication, even in a quantity that might hasten death.159 
As Glucksberg establishes, although the negative right to health may be 
limited by valid governmental interests, that right runs through a long line 
of Supreme Court case law. Indeed, some aspects of that case law, such as 
the post-viability health exception requirement in abortion cases and much 
of the Glucksberg Court’s discussion, would be unexplainable without it.160
B. Reframing the Abor tion Right as a Negative Health Care Right: 
Legal Implications 
 
This Article has elucidated the contours of a possible negative right 
to health and argued that it already exists, at least in incipient form, in U.S. 
constitutional law. Yet given the developed case law and scholarship 
surrounding abortion, in particular the persistent calls to think of the 
abortion right in terms of concepts such as equality and dignity,161
                                                 
158 Id. at 736–37 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 and in 
light of the criticisms of the “medical model” of abortion outlined above, 
why turn to this comparatively narrow and somewhat controversial right to 
frame reproductive rights? This Article argues that there are several 
advantages—political, rhetorical, and legal—to be gained from thinking of 
159 Id. at 736–38 (O’ Connor, J., concurring); id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring); 
id. at 779–82 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring). But see Norman 
L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing, and the Future of Physician-Assisted Death, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 1793, 1835 (2004) (“The legal status of terminal sedation is still unclear.” (citing 
Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct 
Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 142–50 (2000))). 
160 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1986); 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Central 
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76–79 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973). In 
Stenberg, the Court described this jurisprudence as establishing that “the State may promote 
but not endanger a woman’s health when it regulates the methods of abortion.” Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931 (2000). 
161 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–83 (1985); Siegel, Reasoning, supra 
note 36, at 351 (urging reconsideration of the abortion right in terms of equality rather than 
“physiological reasoning”); Siegel, Dignity, supra note 42, at 1703 (framing the abortion 
debate in terms of competing conceptions about dignity); Siegel, New Politics, supra note 
42, at 994 (advocating an equal protection approach to “woman protective” abortion 
legislation”). 
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reproductive rights as health care rights for those who wish to gain lasting 
protection for those rights.162
One of the most important advantages to be gained from advocating 
and foregrounding the negative constitutional right to health is that it may 
provide a framework for challenging various sorts of legal restrictions that 
are usually upheld under current abortion doctrine. Before explaining in 
greater detail what the right to health might do, however, it is important to 
emphasize what it will not do. First, it most likely will not improve access 
to reproductive health services for women who cannot afford them or 
otherwise cannot obtain them due to practical obstacles, such as living in 
areas where there are few providers of such services. Second, it will not 
necessarily be sufficiently robust to ensure that the core of Roe is preserved. 
Although the negative right to health has numerous implications in the 
abortion context, the notion that individuals have a right to make medical 
treatment decisions without interference from the government is probably 
not enough, alone, to ground the right to choose nontherapeutic abortion. 
Even if courts do recognize that a right to make medical treatment decisions 
without government interference must operate in the abortion context, they 




The aim of this Section is not to set out a detailed legal framework 
for analyzing various abortion regulations in terms of a right to health, nor 
is it to develop a comprehensive right–to–health jurisprudence. Instead, this 
 It is certainly conceivable that that state interest would be judged to 
win out over the woman’s right to medical decision–making autonomy. In 
other words, abortion, even early abortion, will likely never be viewed in 
the United States as just another medical procedure. The political stakes are 
too high and the morally fraught nature of the procedure is too inescapable. 
Nonetheless, many contemporary legal controversies concern abortion 
restrictions that are not directly justified by a state interest in protecting 
fetal life. Couching the right involved in such cases in terms of a right to 
medical decision–making autonomy might provide a superior framework 
for vindicating women’s rights. 
                                                 
162 Cf. Robertson, supra note 118, at 19 (suggesting that even if Roe were 
overturned, the government may not be able to ban abortions needed to protect health or life, 
due to the negative right to medical treatment). 
163 In general, the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence applies heightened 
scrutiny to government-imposed burdens on rights recognized as fundamental but still 
requires some form of weighing of the importance of those rights against the state interests 
served by the restrictions. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-22; Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 
(holding that the woman’s procreative liberty must be weighed against the state’s interest in 
potential life). 
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Section suggests several instances in which reconceptualizing abortion 
rights as an aspect of the negative right to health might provide stronger and 
a more coherent standard for challenging certain kinds of abortion 
restrictions, particularly those that are not directly motivated by the state’s 
interest in the fetus. 
1. Informed consent. The often onerous informed consent 
requirements applied in many states exclusively to the abortion procedure 
are classic examples of abortion regulations that are not, generally speaking, 
primarily concerned with fetal protection, but rather with controlling the 
conditions under which women can obtain legal abortions.164 Examples of 
such informed consent requirements include “fetal pain” laws, in which 
women must be told that a fetus over a particular gestational age may feel 
pain (sometimes accompanied by a requirement that she be offered 
anesthesia for the fetus), 165  and the South Dakota informed consent law, 
recently upheld by the en banc Eighth Circuit in Planned Parenthood v. 
Rounds, that requires women seeking abortions to be told that an abortion 
“terminate[s] the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”166
                                                 
164 Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed 
Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 125, 146 & 
nn.206–07 (2008) (noting that informed consent statutes may be designed to discourage 
women from choosing abortion but also that they may be aimed at increasing women’s 
anxiety about abortion, encouraging women to choose anesthesia for the procedure, and 
indirectly increasing the cost of abortions); cf. Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect 
Mother: Why America’s Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the Answer—A 
Comparative Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389, 417-18 (2009) (noting that 
abortion informed consent statutes are unusual in that they mandate the substance of the 
physician’s communication, whereas “most American informed consent law focuses on the 
process of ensuring full communication between patients and their healthcare providers 
rather than the content of the physician-patient dialogue, relying on the healthcare 
professional to determine what information to convey to a particular patient based on her 
own individual needs” (footnotes omitted)). 
 
165 Nine states in all require that women seeking abortions be given information 
about fetal pain. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING 
PERIODS FOR ABORTION (SEPT. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf. For some examples, see ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 20-16-1105 (requiring that certain women seeking abortions be given 
information about fetal pain); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4 (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.35.6 (2001) (same); MINN. STAT. § 145.4243(a)(3) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 
§ 1-738.10 (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305-2(a)(iv)(A). 
166 Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). The South Dakota statute further defines “human being” as “individual living member 
of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being during the entire 
embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-
1(4) (2009). 
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One might also include within this class the requirement in some states that 
a woman seeking an abortion view an ultrasound of the fetus before going 
ahead with the procedure.167
Of course, some of those laws may well have been motivated in 
part by some legislators’ sincere view that such information is necessary to 
decide whether to have an abortion.
 They are measures whose primary effect—and 
perhaps whose primary aim—is to make abortions riskier, more expensive, 
and/or more traumatic. 
168 Many supporters of such laws no 
doubt believe that women would choose not to have abortions if they had 
access to this information. However, the laws are unlikely to have such an 
effect. Indeed, at least one commentator has argued that “even where 
mandated disclosures are . . . calculated to dissuade, it is far from clear that 
a significant number of women will actually forego abortions as a result.”169 
Thus, “[t]he harm of such requirements most likely lies less in scaring 
women into not getting abortions, but in elevating the fear and anxiety 
women experience when they do have abortions.”170
                                                 
167 Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a 
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 377 (2008). Currently, five states—Alabama, 
Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma—require physicians to perform 
ultrasounds and to offer the ultrasound for viewing by the patient before terminating a 
pregnancy in at least some cases. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 36-2301.02; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.012(d)(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.35.2(C) (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34(1) (2007). Eleven other states have 
laws either requiring women to be offered a view of the ultrasound only if the physician 
decides to perform one or allowing women to request a view of the ultrasound. GUTTMACHER 
INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (SEPT. 1, 2009), available 
at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf. Oklahoma’s statute was 
recently struck down in a legal challenge captioned Nova Health Systems v. Henry. OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-738.3b (West 2008); see Steven Ertelt, Oklahoma Judge Tosses 
Abortion-Ultrasound law on Procedural Technicality, LIFENEWS, Aug. 18, 2009, available 
at http://www.lifenews.com/state4356.html. 
 
168 Sanger, supra note 167, at 376–77. Fetal pain laws are somewhat different from 
mandatory ultrasound laws in that the fetal pain laws often require false, or at least 
misleading, information to be given to women about fetal pain. See generally Tobin, supra 
note 164, at 143–48; Robert M. Godzeno, Note, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed 
Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 285, 311 (2009). 
169 Tobin, supra note 164, at 125. For example, women were willing to undergo 
high levels of risk to obtain abortions in the pre-Roe era. Id. at 125 n.79 (citing LESLIE J. 
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE AND LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1867–1973, 193–215 (1997)). 
170 Id. 
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Such laws might be effectively challenged within a framework that 
defined state–imposed stress and other such psychological harm as a result 
of such regulations affecting access to medical services as a violation of the 
right to health, as in the Canadian cases. Because such informed consent 
requirements often impose stress and anguish without any real medical 
benefit, they can be viewed as unacceptable intrusions into the medical 
decision–making process, which should instead be left largely to the patient 
and her physician.171
Of course, any such interference or state–mandated harm would 
have to be balanced against any legitimate government interests served by 
the legislation. Nonetheless, viewing the right to seek medical care and to 
make medical decisions without government interference as fundamental 
would presumably result in more exacting review of such informed consent 
laws than the existing regime derived from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
which explicitly approves informed consent requirements so long as they 
are “truthful and nonmisleading,” regardless of how burdensome or 
coercive they may be.
 Framing the abortion right as a right to autonomy in 
access to medical treatment and in making decisions about medical 
treatment may thus provide a viable route for challenging ultrasound 
requirements and fetal pain laws. 
172 Indeed, it is doubtful that any of the current 
ultrasound laws could be considered an undue burden under Casey, since 
they likely do not present a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.173 
Even to the extent that they may raise the cost of abortions, such increased 
cost is likely insufficient to constitute an undue burden on the abortion 
right, as the Casey Court itself made clear.174
Additionally, the Canadian and South African cases explicitly 
recognize that delay caused by administrative and bureaucratic structures 
affecting access to health care may itself be a form of state–imposed harm. 
 
                                                 
171 See generally Sanger, supra note 164, at 397–401 (discussing how mandatory 
ultrasound statutes are designed to, and do, interfere with the woman’s autonomous decision-
making process). 
172 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); see also 
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733–34 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(identifying Casey’s standard as the applicable one in a challenge to South Dakota’s onerous 
informed consent law); id. at 737 (noting that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of 
showing that the law was “untruthful or misleading”). 
173 See, e.g., Godzeno, supra note 168, at 313–14 (suggesting that mandatory 
ultrasound laws most likely do not constitute an undue burden under Casey). 
174 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
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A focus on delay in accessing services and the harm that can flow from that 
delay may provide an effective device for challenging in–person informed 
consent laws that are combined with a waiting period. These laws often 
result in substantial delay in obtaining the abortion, along with all of the 
health risks associated with that delay. Courts in the United States have 
repeatedly recognized that delay in access to abortion is a form of 
interference with “medically appropriate treatment.”175 At the same time, 
courts almost universally uphold such waiting periods because they do not, 
under Casey, appear to constitute a substantial obstacle to accessing the 
procedure itself.176
Viewing abortion rights as an aspect of the negative right to health, 
moreover, would constitute a partial return to the medical model of 
abortion, in which abortion is treated in most respects like any other 
medical procedure. This approach mirrors somewhat the approach of the 
Canadian and South African constitutions, which make strong and explicit 
connections between the right to choose abortion and the right to make 
medical treatment decisions in other areas. Such an approach—viewing 
abortion as just another medical procedure, at least with respect to laws 
such as informed consent requirements where fetal protection is not actually 
the goal—might be more protective of women’s autonomy than the current 
approach. As Professor Maya Manian has demonstrated, the law of 
informed consent in the abortion context has increasingly diverged from the 
general law of informed consent since the early post–Roe cases, in which 




                                                 
175 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910, 920 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing 
with the lower court that a “forty-eight-hour delay required by the [parental notice law] 
would interfere with the medically appropriate treatment—an abortion—for these women”); 
A Woman’s Choice—East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1173 
(S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting harmful delay caused by in-person informed consent law, combined 
with a waiting period), rev’d, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 The height of this divergence may well be Gonzales v. 
176 See, e.g., Cincinnati Women’s Services, Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 372–74 (6th 
Cir. 2006); A Woman’s Choice—East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 693 
(7th Cir. 2002) (upholding Indiana waiting period law and noting that “[n]o court anywhere 
in the country (other than [the court below]) has held any similar law invalid in the years 
since Casey”); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 531–32 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Utah Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1487–91 (D. Utah 1994), rev’d in 
part, 75 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995). 
177 Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion 
Decision-Making, DUKE J. GENDER L. &  POL’Y 225, 244–47 (2009) (discussing City of 
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. Am. 
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). 
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Carhart, in which the Court accepted paternalistic “woman–protective” 
reasoning for both allegedly protecting women from psychological harm by 
banning an abortion procedure altogether and subjecting some women to 
serious physical risks. And according to Manian, “Carhart’s ‘woman–
protective’ rationale has already had significant impact in the courts and in 
the public arena, as exhibited particularly by legislatures enacting even 
more biased ‘informed consent’ laws, such as the legislation recently 
upheld in South Dakota.”178 It is thus reasonable to think that keeping 
abortion rights and reproductive health care within the general legal 
framework regulating health care might have led courts in a notably 
different direction.179
2. Bans on particular methods of abortion. A medical autonomy 
framework also better explains precisely what is so problematic about both 
the so–called “partial–birth abortion” bans and other regulations of abortion 
methods, such as recent attempts to regulate the abortion drug 
mifepristone.
 
180 “Partial–birth” abortion bans do not prevent women from 
obtaining abortions but simply require them to have abortions by riskier 
methods. As explained above with respect to Stenberg v. Carhart and 
Gonzales v. Carhart, such bans are thus not aimed directly at the right to 
choose abortion in the way that the criminal prohibition at issue in Roe v. 
Wade was; nor are they technically about relegating women to a particular 
status in society through forced childbearing. Rather, they are aimed at 
intruding on the doctor–patient relationship in a way that forces women to 
undergo risks to their health that they and their doctors feel are unnecessary 
and excessive. As such, robust recognition of a right to avoid state–
mandated physical harm and to seek medical care autonomously and 
without interference from the state could well provide more protection to 
women for whom such banned procedures are deemed more medically 
appropriate.181
                                                 
178 Id. at 289 (discussing Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 
(8th Cir. 2008)). 
 
179 Cf. Rebecca Dresser, Protecting Women from Their Abortion Choices, 37 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 14 (2007) (“It is difficult to see why the worry about patients’ 
sensibilities merits denying them access to only one of many possibly disturbing medical 
interventions.”). 
180 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.123 (West 2004); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-729 
(West 2008). 
181 Indeed, such a right would look very much like the standard articulated in 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), according to which a statute lacking a health 
exception is unconstitutional if it imposes significant health risks on some women, id. at 
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Similarly, litigation is currently pending in Ohio over a law that 
purports to require physicians to prescribe the abortifacient mifepristone at 
an unnecessarily high dosage and only through seven weeks of pregnancy, 
although it can be used safely and effectively at a lower dosage until at least 
eight or nine weeks.182 What is so troubling about a law that might prescribe 
dosages and unnecessary time limitations on the abortion drug is that it 
interferes in the doctor–patient relationship in ways that are medically 
unnecessary and inappropriate. It interferes with women’s medical 
autonomy and may impose physical or psychological injury by forcing 
some women, such as those who are beyond the statute’s time limit, to 
choose surgical abortion procedures when they would prefer equally safe 
and effective medical abortions.183
The “undue burden” framework set forth in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey fails to capture those troubling aspects of such laws. Under Casey, 
abortion restrictions are unconstitutional only if they place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, and delay and 
increased cost alone cannot constitute undue burdens.
 It attempts to micromanage the 
physician–patient relationship and may impose additional and unnecessary 
financial and emotional costs on patients. 
184
                                                                                                                 
937–38. But the litigation over this issue has centered on the health exception requirement, 
derived from Roe but never explicitly justified in terms of a negative right to health. The lack 
of explicit justification for the health exception requirement may partly explain the Court’s 
decision to depart from Stenberg in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Again, 
making the negative right to health explicit and grounding the unconstitutionality of the 
D&X ban in that right might have better protected a woman’s right to choose the most 
medically appropriate abortion procedure for her; it would have arguably justified facial, 
rather than as-applied, invalidation of the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act at issue in 
Gonzales v. Carhart as an unwarranted intrusion in the doctor-patient relationship, in 
addition to an imposition of physical harm by the state. 
 The notion that an 
182 Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Strickland, 531 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 
2008); Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2006). 
Although it is unclear whether the law does ban these uses of the drug; the state has taken the 
position that it does so. In the interest of full disclosure, this Author is lead counsel for one 
of the plaintiffs in this litigation. 
183 See, e.g., Joanna N. Erdman, Amy Grenon & Leigh Harrison-Wilson, 
Medication Abortion in Canada: A Right-to-Health Perspective, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1764, 1766 (2008) (noting that the advantages of medication abortion that may lead some 
women to prefer it over surgical methods). 
184 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (defining 
“undue burden”). The Court noted that a twenty-four-hour waiting period requiring two trips 
to the clinic will increase costs and delay abortions, but found that the measure did not 
constitute an undue burden, and held that the fact that the measure limits a physician’s 
discretion does not require its invalidation. Id. at 885-86. 
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abortion restriction violates the Constitution only if it actually impedes a 
woman’s access to abortion by placing a substantial obstacle in her path 
misses the various ways in which many abortion restrictions violate 
women’s dignity and autonomy within the physician–patient relationship. 
Such laws can, however, effectively—and perhaps most effectively—be 
framed primarily as a violation of the negative right to health.185 Indeed, at 
least one commentator has suggested that denial of access to a preferred 
abortion method constitutes a violation of the Canadian and international 
right to health.186
3. Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers (TRAP Laws). The 
term “TRAP laws” refers to “laws that single out physicians’ offices and 
outpatient clinics where abortions are performed, and subject them to wide–
ranging medical, administrative, and facility requirements that are not 
imposed on comparable medical facilities.”
 
187 TRAP laws often have the 
effect, and perhaps the purpose, of increasing the cost of abortion services 
both to patients and to clinics. Indeed, some have suggested that TRAP laws 
are responsible for running some abortion providers out of business, making 
abortions less accessible in any given geographic area.188
                                                 
185 One might argue that because of the deep political divisions surrounding 
abortion rights, the strategy of relating abortion to other forms of health care risks backfiring 
by encouraging greater regulation of all health care providers and procedures in order to be 
able to regulate abortion. As an empirical matter, it is hard to know how great this danger is. 
 
186 Erdman, et al., supra note 183, at 1766; cf. id. at 1768 (arguing that under the 
right to health “[g]overnment may not obstruct the approval of safe and effective medicines, 
nor may it remain passive when financial and political barriers impede the introduction of 
essential reproductive health medicines”). 
187 Amalia W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion 
Providers: A New Constitutional Strategy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1563, 1568 (2005). Such 
requirements may include “training and qualification specifications for staff members; 
mandatory testing of patients for sexually transmitted diseases, even if unnecessary for their 
treatment; requiring employees to submit to physical examinations; and requirements 
regarding the physical design and function of the clinic itself”—to the point of 
“‘micromanaging everything from elevator safety to countertop varnish to the locations of 
janitors’ closets’”—as well as “authoriz[ing] state health departments to inspect the offices 
and medical records of abortion providers who are subject to these licensing schemes 
without a warrant or probable cause to search.” Id. at 1569 (quoting Greenville Women’s 
Clinic v. Comm’r, 317 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., dissenting)) (footnotes 
omitted). 
188 Id. at 1567. 
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However, constitutional challenges to such onerous and 
unnecessary abortion–specific regulations have largely failed.189 While 
TRAP laws increase the cost of abortions and ultimately render them 
inaccessible in some places, they are rarely considered sufficiently onerous 
to constitute an “undue burden” on the abortion right under Casey, and they 
do not invoke any heightened scrutiny under an equal protection analysis.190 
In fact, as Professor Gillian Metzger has argued, TRAP laws often appear to 
courts “as a species of ordinary regulation with the effect that courts assess 
their constitutionality against the background of the government’s broad 
power to regulate in the name of health as well as doctrines of deference to 
administrative expertise.”191
little more than a codification of national medical—and 
abortion—association recommendations designed to ensure the 
health and appropriate care of women seeking abortions; . . . 
[they do] not “strike at the [abortion] right itself”; . . . the 
increased costs of abortions caused by implementation of [such 
laws], while speculative, are even yet modest and have not been 
shown to burden the ability of a woman to make the decision to 
have an abortion; and abortion clinics may rationally be regulated 
as a class while other clinics or medical practices are not.
 As the Fourth Circuit explained in turning 
away a challenge to a North Carolina TRAP law in Greenville Women’s 
Clinic v. Bryant, such laws are: 
192
A doctrine that viewed bureaucratically–imposed obstacles to 
obtaining medical care as interfering with a fundamental right, by contrast, 
would invoke heightened scrutiny for TRAP laws. The delays in obtaining 
abortions and the increased health risks that such delays entail are not 
unlike the problems created by the Québec law struck down in Chaoulli as 
interfering with the right to security of the person.
 
193
                                                 
189 Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 
EMORY L.J. 865, 873–75, 873 n.29 (2007). 
 A right–to–health 
framework for analyzing TRAP laws would thus likely protect access to 
abortion more fully than Casey’s undue burden standard currently does. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 868. 
192 222 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)). 
193 Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 ¶¶ 41-43, 123 (Can.). 
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Of course, some bureaucratic regulation would still be permissible 
and even necessary under this new framework. The fundamental right to 
noninterference in one’s decision to seek medical treatment would have to 
be weighed against certain legitimate government interests, such as safety 
and public health. However, at least in the right–to–health framework, 
administrative regulations in the form of TRAP laws would receive a higher 
level of scrutiny than they currently do, and they would likely be held 
unconstitutional more often. 
C. Reframing the Abor tion Right as a Negative Health Care Right: 
Other  Implications 
In addition to providing new ways of framing various legal issues 
pertaining to abortion rights, placing reproductive rights within the broader 
framework of health care rights may have several political and rhetorical 
advantages. First, putting reproductive rights in the context of health care 
rights in general may garner a wider base of political support for 
government noninterference with women’s access to reproductive health 
care than framing the issue in terms of reproductive choice, privacy, or even 
equality has done. The right to health, as a right to medical decision–
making autonomy, is an inclusive concept that touches on areas that are of 
concern or likely to one day be of concern to most people. As people age, 
they begin to worry more about their future interactions with the medical 
establishment in the context of end–of–life decision making, access to 
appropriate palliative care, and possibly to experimental drugs; in 
particular, they may reasonably fear that intrusive government regulators 
will attempt to control those interactions.194 There may be substantial 
political support for the idea that the government should not dictate health 
care decisions, whether they are decisions about experimental treatments for 
cancer or reproductive health care.195
                                                 
194 Consider, for example, the controversy over the death of Terri Schiavo, the 
woman in a persistent vegetative state whose husband faced a long political and legal battle 
when he attempted to have her feeding tube removed. Ultimately, the political frenzy over 
the right-to-die issue—which included lawmakers discussing in detail the minutiae of Ms. 
Schiavo’s medical condition—backfired on conservative lawmakers who had attempted to 
prolong Ms. Schiavo’s life. See generally Ruth A. Miller, On Freedom and Feeding Tubes: 
Reviving Terri Schiavo and Trying Saddam Hussein, 19 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 161, 180–
81 (2007) (describing the “fascination with the minutiae of [Schiavo’s] bodily function”); 
Charles Babington, Post-Schiavo Questions Await Congress’s GOP Leaders, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 5, 2005, at A4 (describing the backlash). 
 Indeed, the notion of a right to health 
195 Cf. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reversing the appellate panel’s decision that plaintiffs 
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is not gender–specific, and therefore may carry a broader political appeal 
than the notion of a right to gender equality or reproductive decision–
making autonomy. 
Focusing on the medical aspects of abortion may have other 
rhetorical advantages as well. Putting the abortion right into this broader 
context—the context of medical decision–making—would highlight the fact 
that the abortion decision is at least in part a decision about medical 
treatment, not merely an economic transaction in which one vulnerable 
party stands to be exploited. The view of women as perpetually vulnerable 
to the efforts of profit–seeking abortion providers who force them into 
procedures they do not want arguably pervades portions of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, for example.196 In an area that is 
so heavily driven by political rhetoric, influencing the language used to 
describe abortion and abortion providers could tip the scales of public and 
perhaps even judicial opinion in favor of pro–choice advocates in some 
instances.197
Moreover, emphasizing the medical side of abortion rights may 
engage non–obstetrician physicians more in reproductive rights issues. 
After all, many of the legal restrictions that apply to abortion providers 
would probably strike other physicians as outrageous if applied to them. 
Indeed, the Doe v. Bolton court’s embrace of the medical model of abortion, 
which compared abortion to “other surgical procedures” and found the 
uniquely onerous regulation of abortion to be constitutionally problematic, 
is an approach that has largely disappeared from reproductive rights case 
 
                                                                                                                 
had a constitutional right to access experimental cancer drugs that had passed only Phase I 
review by the FDA). 
196 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“In a decision so fraught with 
emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means 
that will be used, confining themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure 
entails.”); id. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s view, which 
relies in part on “women’s fragile state” to deny them reproductive autonomy). 
197 Similarly, putting abortion into a broader context of medical treatment may 
minimize the tendency on the part of some to forget that the doctors who provide abortions 
are “physicians” and not, as Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia referred to them in Stenberg 
v. Carhart, “abortionists.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); id. at 957–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The word “abortionist” is generally 
understood to have negative connotations. In addition, it is often used to refer to non-
physicians who performed abortions when it was illegal, and often did so unsafely. See, e.g., 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (referring to “back-alley abortionists”). Notably, Justice 
Kennedy switched to the term “doctor” in Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124. 
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law but that might provide a framework for criticizing many abortion 
regulations, especially TRAP laws.198
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Although reproductive rights activists often recognize in their 
rhetoric and their arguments that the abortion right is at least partly about 
the right to make medical treatment decisions autonomously, many feminist 
scholars and advocates tend to downplay this argument. It may be time to 
re–think that strategy, however, and to embrace this aspect of abortion 
rights more fully. This Article recognizes that such an approach will not be 
a panacea; it will not necessarily increase access to reproductive health care 
for those who cannot afford it, for example. Moreover, such a right would 
be subject to balancing against recognized government interests, such as the 
state’s interest in potential life and in regulating the practice of medicine in 
the interest of safety. Finally, the right—which I contend is already 
established, if only implicitly, within substantive due process doctrine—will 
no doubt strike some as novel and unlikely to garner the support of courts in 
the near future. Nonetheless, it is still a path worth pursuing, given the 
relative lack of scrutiny applied to most types of abortion restrictions in the 
wake of Planned Parenthood v. Casey199 and the confused but unpromising 
state of abortion jurisprudence in the wake of Gonzales v. Carhart.200
                                                 
198 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192, 197, 199 (1973). 
 In 
particular, this model possesses potential for reframing—both rhetorically 
and legally—some current legal controversies for which Casey’s “undue 
burden” standard and even the language of equality and dignity provide 
little basis for challenge. 
199 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
200 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
